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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this 
matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from a final judgment of the Third District 
Court. (R. 2216-25.) The appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. 
(See R. 2237.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues 
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing, on summary judgment, the claims of 
Plaintiff Volvo Commercial Finance LLC, The Americas ("Volvo Finance11) against 
Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"), for conversion, unjust enrichment, 
and constructive trust. Volvo Finance asserted that Wells Fargo wrongfully received 
nearly $700,000 in proceeds generated by the sale of 53 commercial trucks, when Volvo 
Finance had a perfected purchase money security interest in the trucks and all proceeds 
thereof. The seller of the trucks transferred the funds into its account with Wells Fargo, 
and Wells Fargo seized those funds in repayment of an overdraft advance. This issue will 
require the consideration of the following legal question: 
a. How do the governing tracing rules apply when a debtor transfers 
funds from a commingled account to a new account and then dissipates the funds 
remaining in the first account; may a creditor with a claim to the funds trace them to the 
second account, or does the transfer defeat the creditor's interest in those funds? 
Additionally, Volvo Finance anticipates that Wells Fargo may raise one or 
both of the following issues in its opposing brief: 
- 1 . 
b. Whether Volvo Finance's claim is barred under Revised Article 9 of 
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, even though Revised Article 9 was not in effect 
when the events giving rise to this litigation occurred. 
c. Whether Volvo Finance's claim is barred under the purported 
"ordinary course" defense discussed in a comment to Section 9-306 of former Article 9. 
Volvo Finance addressed these issues in its memorandum opposing Wells Fargo's 
summary judgment motion, R. 1451 -81. 
Standard of Review 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, all facts and inferences are viewed in a 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and no deference is given to the trial court's 
ruling. Rg,, Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 855-56 (Utah 1998); Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306: 
"Proceeds" — Secured party's rights on disposition of collateral or 
debtor's insolvency [Repealed effective July 1, 2001]. 
(1) "Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, lease, exchange, 
collection, or other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable 
by reason of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the 
extent that it is payable to a person other than a party to the security 
agreement. Any payments or distributions made with respect to investment 
property collateral are proceeds. Money, checks, deposit accounts, and the 
like are "cash proceeds." All other proceeds are "noncash proceeds." 
(2) Except where this chapter or Chapter 2a, Leases, otherwise provides, a 
security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange, or 
other disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the 
secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in 
any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 70A-9a-709(U: 
Priority. 
(1) This act [Revised Article 9] determines the priority of conflicting claims 
to collateral. However, if the relative priorities of the claims were 
established before this act takes effect, former Chapter 9 determines 
priority. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This lawsuit arises out of the collapse of the "Great Basin" chain of commercial 
truck dealerships in Salt Lake City and throughout the Intermountain West. Four of the 
dealerships had identical "floor plan" financing agreements with Plaintiff Volvo Finance, 
under which Volvo Finance advanced funds to enable Great Basin to purchase truck 
inventory. The floor plan agreements granted Volvo Finance a purchase money security 
interest in the trucks financed and all proceeds thereof. To perfect its security interest, 
Volvo Finance filed UCC-1 Financing Statements in each state in which the dealerships 
operated. 
Great Basin did much of its banking through Defendant Wells Fargo. Each of the 
Great Basin dealerships made deposits into its local Wells Fargo branch, and the funds 
were automatically swept into a central "concentration account" at the end of each day. 
In late December 2000, Wells Fargo paid several items out of the Concentration 
Account, even though the Account had insufficient funds to cover them, creating an 
$800,000+ overdraft in the account. On December 29, 2000, Great Basin transferred 
$900,000 from an account at First Security Bank (the "First Security Account") to the 
Concentration Account. Wells Fargo used the funds transferred on December 29 to repay 
itself for the advances Wells Fargo had made to cover the overdrafts. A significant 
portion of the funds that Great Basin transferred into the Concentration Account, 
however, were proceeds subject to Volvo Finance's security interest. About a week later, 
Great Basin filed for bankruptcy, owing Volvo Finance millions of dollars. 
Volvo Finance has determined that under the applicable tracing rules, including 
the lowest intermediate balance rule, approximately $693,000 of the $900,000 transferred 
to Wells Fargo on December 29, 2000, was traceable to the sales of 53 trucks which 
Volvo Finance had financed under the Floor Plan Agreements (these 53 trucks are 
referred to as the "Volvo-Financed Vehicles"). After its demand for payment was 
rejected, Volvo Finance initiated this lawsuit. 
A key issue during the litigation was the proper treatment of two transfers Great 
Basin had made on December 21 and 22. On those days, Great Basin transferred a total 
of $2 million from the Concentration Account to the First Security Account. The funds 
remaining in the Concentration Account were soon dissipated, but the funds going to the 
First Security Account were fully preserved until the December 29 transfer back to Wells 
Fargo. Volvo Finance's tracing analysis concluded that under the lowest intermediate 
balance rule, the $2 million transferred on December 21 and 22 included all sales 
proceeds that were then in the Concentration Account. Wells Fargo disagrees. 
The trial court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo, ruling that, as a matter 
of law, Wells Fargo did not receive any proceeds traceable to the Volvo-Financed 
Vehicles. The trial court adopted Wells Fargofs treatment of the $2 million transferred on 
December 21 and 22, concluding that the proceeds from the Vehicles remained in the 
Concentration Account to the greatest extent possible, and as such Volvo Finance lost its 
claim to those funds when the Concentration Account was dissipated. 
Volvo Finance now appeals. There is no authority supporting the trial court's 
application of the tracing rules. To the contrary, courts have long held that when a debtor 
or trustee transfers funds from one account to another and then depletes the first account, 
the creditor or beneficiary may follow the funds into the new account. That is exactly 
what Volvo Finance asked the trial court to do. 
Course of Proceedings 
Volvo Finance filed its complaint on June 13, 2002, stating claims for conversion, 
unjust enrichment, and constructive trust. (R. 1-15.) On March 19, 2003, Wells Fargo 
filed its amended answer, denying liability and raising several affirmative defenses. (R. 
71-81.) 
On September 10, 2003, Volvo Finance moved for partial summary judgment, 
seeking a determination of liability only. (R. 761-63.) On November 12, 2004, Wells 
Fargo moved for summary judgment on all claims. (R. 813-15.) A hearing took place 
on the motions on May 17, 2005. (R. 2209.) On November 14, 2005, the trial court 
issued a written order granting Wells Fargo's motion. (R. 2210-15, Add. Ex. 1.) 
On December 5, 2005, the trial court entered Judgment dismissing all claims with 
prejudice. (R. 2216-25.) Volvo Finance filed its notice of appeal on December 7. (R. 
2226-28.) 
Statement of Facts 
A. Background: Volvo Finance's Financing Arrangements with Great 
Basin and Security Interest in Great Basin's Collateral. 
As of December 2000, Volvo Finance had entered into Floor Plan Financing 
Agreements and Security Agreements with four of the Great Basin Dealerships: 
(a) Great Basin GMC Trucks, Inc. (based in Salt Lake City); (b) Arizona Great Basin 
Trucks, Inc. (Phoenix); (c) Great Basin Southwest Trucks, Inc. (Albuquerque); and 
(d) Idaho Great Basin Trucks, Inc. (Boise). (See R. 181-266, 536-56.) The Financing 
and Security Agreements, identical in their relevant parts, granted Volvo Finance a 
security interest in "all new and used trucks, motor vehicles, tractors, trailers and similar 
equipment of Debtor [Great Basin] . . . and all proceeds of the foregoing." (R. 539, 551 
(emphasis added).) 
The Financing Agreements provided that upon the sale of a vehicle, Great Basin 
was to "immediately pay to Company [Volvo Finance] an amount equal to the unpaid 
balance of the amount advanced with respect to the item of inventory sold." (See R. 
540.) All funds due to Volvo Finance were to be sent immediately by wire transfer, "on 
the same business day if possible, and if not, then on the next business day." (Id.) Volvo 
Finance filed UCC-1 Financing Statements describing its security interest in the vehicles 
and proceeds in the pertinent jurisdictions. (See R. 299-322, 567-69.) Between July 
1999 and December 2000, Volvo Finance financed Great Basin's purchase of the 53 
vehicles at issue in this lawsuit (the "Volvo-Financed Vehicles1'). (See R. 571-90.) 
This arrangement was successful for a number of years, but a routine audit 
conducted in September 2000 revealed that Great Basin was not timely remitting funds to 
Volvo Finance. On December 8, 2000, after several rounds of follow-up correspondence 
and audits, Volvo Finance formally notified Great Basin that it was in default under their 
agreements, and that Volvo Finance would not release the title certificates or "MSOs" for 
any sold vehicles unless Volvo Finance received payment for those vehicles. (See R. 
592-96.) Unfortunately, Great Basin continued to breach its obligations under the Floor 
Plan Agreements: From December 7 through December 29, 2000, Great Basin sold the 
53 vehicles, receiving proceeds in excess of $5 million, and failed to pay any of that 
money to Volvo Finance. (See R. 604-06.) By the end of December 2000, the Great 
Basin Entities owed Volvo Finance approximately $30 million. (See R. 706, f 9.) 
B. The Bank Transactions, 
As of December 2000, Great Basin held a number of "Dealership Accounts" with 
Wells Fargo, one for each of its individual dealerships. (See R. 598-606.) Great Basin 
also held a "Concentration Account" with Wells Fargo. (See R. 598, 604.) Each 
dealership would deposit funds, including sales proceeds, into the Dealership Accounts, 
and each night the funds in those accounts were automatically swept into the 
Concentration Account. (See R. 824.) 
At the close of business on December 20, 2000, the Concentration Account held 
just under $3 million, including approximately $1.7 million in proceeds attributable to the 
sale of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles. (See Tracing Analysis, R. 1484, Add. Ex. 2.1) 
Over the next two days, Great Basin transferred exactly $2 million from the Concen-
tration Account to a newly opened account at First Security (the "First Security 
Account"). (See id.) All funds remaining in the Concentration Account after the transfer 
were dissipated by December 26. (Id.) 
On December 27, over $1 million worth of items were presented to Wells Fargo 
for payment out of the Concentration Account. (See R. 614.) Wells Fargo paid those 
items, even though the Concentration Account lacked sufficient funds to cover them. 
(Concentration Account Statement, R. 614, Add. Ex. 3; R. 662-63, 682-86.) As of the 
close of business on December 27, the Concentration Account was overdrawn by 
$790,160.73. (See Statement at R. 615.) 
The following day, additional items were presented to Wells Fargo for payment 
out of the Concentration Account. (See id. at R. 614.) Wells Fargo paid those as well, 
even though, once again, the account lacked sufficient funds. (See id. at R. 614-15; R. 
664-65, 687-92.) Thus, as of the close of business on December 28, 2000, the overdraft 
had reached $828,951.36. (See Statement at R. 615.) 
On December 29, 2000, Great Basin transferred $900,000 from the First Security 
Account to the Concentration Account. (See id. at R. 612; R, 657, 692.) Wells Fargofs 
system automatically subtracted the amount of the previously existing overdrafts (or 
In addition to being included as Addendum Exhibit 2, a separate removable color 
copy of the Analysis has been placed in the pocket on the inside back cover of each copy 
of this brief. Counsel would be happy to provide additional copies if requested. 
"negative balance1') of $828,951.36, thus making only $71,048.64 available for use by the 
Great Basin Entities. (See Statement at R. 615; R. 689-93, 698-99.) 
Volvo Finance's expert has testified that the $900,000 transfer from the First 
Security Account to the Concentration Account included $693,132 of proceeds traceable 
to the sale of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles. (R. 629; Tracing Analysis, Add. Ex. 2.) 
Wells Fargo maintains that no proceeds were transferred. 
C. Wells Fargo Ignores Volvo Finance's Security Interest in the Proceeds 
Despite Actual and Constructive Notice, 
Wells Fargo admitted in depositions that it did essentially no investigation or 
analysis of Great Basin's financial status before deciding to pay the items for which 
insufficient funds existed in the Concentration Account. Wells Fargo failed to consider 
(a) whether Great Basin was in debt to others besides Wells Fargo, (b) how much Great 
Basin may have owed to those other creditors, (c) whether Great Basin was in default on 
any of its debt obligations to other creditors, (d) whether any of Great Basin's debt 
obligations were secured, or even (e) whether any other creditor of Great Basin had an 
interest in the funds that Great Basin was going to transfer to cover the overdrafts. (R. 
694, 1004-05, 1106-07.) Wells Fargo did not search the UCC filings to determine 
whether any creditors had security interests in any of Great Basin's property. (R. 604, 
700.) Wells Fargo knew, however, that Great Basin's floor plan financing was being 
provided by Volvo Finance, and that Great Basin's debt obligations to Volvo Finance 
were secured at least by Great Basin's inventory, i.e., commercial trucks. (R. 1004-05.) 
Wells Fargo also knew that the funds Great Basin was going to use to cover the 
overdrafts were likely proceeds of the sale of commercial trucks. (See id) 
D. Great Basin's Collapse. 
Great Basinfs house of cards soon collapsed, and on January 5, 2001, Great Basin 
filed for bankruptcy. (R. 831.) At the time, Great Basin owed Volvo Finance more than 
$30 million for floor plan financing. (R. 1314.) Volvo Finance therefore retained the 
local accounting firm of Nielson Elggren to assist it in examining Great Basin's records 
and tracing the funds from the sales of Volvo-Financed Vehicles. (R. 618.) Using the 
lowest intermediate balance rule ("LIBR"), Nielson Elggren determined that 
approximately $693,000 of the $900,000 transferred to Wells Fargo on December 29, 
2000, were proceeds traceable to the sales of the Vehicles. (Tracing Analysis, Add. Ex. 
2.) 
Nielson Elggrenfs tracing analysis also revealed that in addition to the proceeds 
that were transferred to the Wells Fargo Concentration Account on December 29, a 
significant sum of proceeds (roughly $3.5 million) ended up in the possession of Zions 
Bank, with whom Great Basin had other accounts and other obligations. (Id.; R. 605-06, 
619-20.) Volvo Finance presented its tracing analysis to Zions Bank, and recognizing 
Volvo Finance's superior interest, Zions ultimately repaid a significant portion of these 
funds to Volvo Finance. (R. 488.) 
After reaching its settlement with Zions concerning the proceeds that ended up 
with Zions, Volvo Finance sought payment from Wells Fargo for the proceeds that were 
transferred to Wells Fargo on December 29. (Id.) But instead of acknowledging Volvo 
Finance's right to the proceeds of the Vehicles, as Zions had done, Wells Fargo denied 
liability. (Id) 
E. The Litigation, 
Volvo Finance therefore initiated this lawsuit, stating claims for conversion, unjust 
enrichment, and a constructive trust. Wells Fargo did not seriously dispute Volvo 
Finance's security interest in the Vehicles or the facts regarding the sale of the Vehicles 
and the deposit and transfers of the funds. (See Stipulation of Facts, R. 2193-2208.) 
Wells Fargo's expert, however, disputed Nielson Elggren's application of the tracing 
rules. (See R. 1217-76.) Wells Fargo also raised a number of affirmative defenses, 
asserting that even if Wells Fargo received funds traceable to the Vehicles, Wells Fargo 
would not be liable. (R. 76-79.) 
After discovery, Volvo Finance moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a 
ruling that Wells Fargo was liable for conversion to the extent it received funds traceable 
to the Vehicles. (R. 481-763.) Volvo Finance asked for a ruling that it had a superior 
right to any proceeds that were transferred to the Concentration Account on December 
29, 2000, and that Wells Fargo's affirmative defenses lacked merit as a matter of law. 
Wells Fargo filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asking the trial court to 
dismiss all of Volvo Finance's claims. (R. 813-1141.) Wells Fargo argued that under 
LIBR, the first funds taken out of an account must be considered non-proceeds, even if 
those funds are merely transferred between the debtor's own accounts. (R. 832-40.) As 
such, Wells Fargo argued, the $2 million Great Basin transferred from the Concentration 
Account to the First Security Account included primarily non-proceeds, and the funds 
that were transferred back on December 29 did not include any traceable proceeds at all. 
(14) 
Wells Fargo sought judgment on two additional grounds. First, Wells Fargo 
contended that even if funds were traceable to the Vehicles, Wells Fargo had a superior 
right to those funds under Revised UCC Article 9. (R. 840-42.) Second, Wells Fargo 
argued that under the purported "ordinary course" defense, based on a statement in a 
comment to pre-revision UCC 9-306, Wells Fargo had a superior right to the funds, 
notwithstanding Volvo Finance's perfected purchase money security interest, because 
Wells Fargo did not have actual knowledge of Volvo Finance's claim to those specific 
funds. (R. 842-49.) (Volvo Finance's motion had previously raised the "ordinary course" 
issue, asking the court to strike Wells Fargo's 13th and 14th affirmative defenses, which 
were based on that provision.) 
Opposing the motion, Volvo Finance explained that under the lowest intermediate 
balance rule, funds do not lose their status as proceeds when they are transferred between 
a debtor's own accounts. (R. 1451-64.) Volvo Finance cited nine cases, plus treatises, a 
law review article, and two restatements, supporting this position. (R. 1456-60.) 
Volvo Finance further pointed out that Revised Article 9 did not govern the 
present case since that revision was not effective until July 1, 2001. (R. 1464-67.) Volvo 
Finance also explained that in Insley Manufacturing Co. v. Draper Bank & Trust 717 
P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986), a case nearly identical to the present one, the Utah Supreme 
Court held, explicitly, that a secured party's right to trace proceeds prevails over the 
rights of a setting-off bank even if the bank does not have actual knowledge of the 
secured party's interest. (R. 1467-80.) 
The cross-motions were argued on May 17, 2005, after which the trial court took 
the matter under advisement. On November 14, the court granted Wells Fargo's motion 
on the ground that the December 21-22 transfers from the Concentration Account to the 
First Security Account defeated Volvo Finance's claim to the funds. (R. 2210-15, Add. 
Ex. 1.) Despite the case law and other sources Volvo Finance supplied, the trial court 
stated that there was ,fno authority" supporting Volvo Finance's treatment of the transfers. 
(See id. at R. 2213.) The trial court did not address the two additional grounds Wells 
Fargo had raised. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In granting summary judgment against Volvo Finance, the trial court disregarded 
over a century's worth of authority. Courts in several jurisdictions have held that when a 
trustee or debtor commingles trust funds and personal funds in an account, transfers some 
of those funds to a new account, and then dissipates the funds remaining in the original 
account, the transferred funds remain subject to the beneficiaryfs claim. These courts 
have expressly rejected the argument that Wells Fargo made below and the trial court 
adopted, i.e., that the first funds taken out of an account must be treated as the trustee's 
own funds, even if the trustee retains full possession and control over those funds. 
Notably, neither Wells Fargo nor the trial court was able to cite a single case extending 
LIBR to cover a transfer between accounts held by the trustee. 
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Further, the trial court's ruling frustrates the reasoning behind LIBR. The lowest 
intermediate balance rule presumes that a trustee acts honestly, and that when a trustee 
spends money from a commingled account, he or she is spending personal funds first. By 
this presumption, the rule preserves the trust account to the greatest extent possible. The 
trial court overturned this presumption by ruling that when Great Basin transferred funds 
to the First Security Account and then dissipated the Concentration Account, Great Basin 
was actually spending trust money and retaining its own funds. Further, by ruling that a 
transfer between accounts was enough to deprive Volvo Finance of its claim to the sales 
proceeds in Great Basin's accounts, the trial court exalted form over substance; the 
important question in tracing funds is whether the trustee kept the funds or dissipated 
them, but the trial court's ruling focused on the method the trustee used to keep the funds. 
The Court should therefore hold that the trial court erred in its interpretation of LIBR. 
The trial court's ruling cannot be justified on the basis of the two other grounds 
Wells Fargo raised below, either. Wells Fargo's reliance on revised Article 9 is clearly 
improper, as that Article did not go into effect until July 2001, and the Revised Article 
itself states that it does not apply where relative priorities were established prior to the 
Act's effective date. When Wells Fargo's conversion took place in December 2000, the 
parties' relative priorities were established, as Volvo Finance already had a perfected 
purchase money security interest in Great Basin's inventory and the proceeds thereof. 
When Revised Article 9 was enacted, creditors in Volvo Finance's position were given 
until July 2001 to take the additional steps required to protect their interest in a debtor's 
proceeds, and it would be unfair and illogical to hold that Volvo Finance's claim is barred 
because it had not taken those steps by December 2000. 
Finally, Wells Fargofs "ordinary course" defense should be rejected as a matter of 
law. The ordinary course defense is not even part of the UCC; it appears only in a 
comment to one of the sections in Article 9. Moreover, Utah law precludes application of 
the ordinary course defense, as the reasoning behind the defense flatly contradicts the 
reasoning of Insley. Even apart from Insley, cases from other jurisdictions establish that 
in situations like the one at present, i.e., where a bank lends money to a customer after the 
customer is already in debt to secured creditors, a bank may not rely on the ordinary 
course defense to claim proceeds from inventory covered by a senior security interest. At 
the very least, even if the ordinary course defense were viable in Utah, Wells Fargo did 
not establish that the defense applies as a matter of law. As such, summary judgment was 
simply not appropriate. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST VOLVO FINANCE 
A, Under the Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule, Volvo Finance's claim is not 
defeated by Great Basin's transfer of $2 million from the Concentration 
Account to the First Security Account on December 21 and 22, 2000. 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that the lowest 
intermediate balance rule bars Volvo Finance's claim for conversion. 
1. Preliminary Point: Wells Fargo is liable for conversion to the extent 
Wells Fargo received proceeds of Great Basin's sale of the Volvo-
Financed Vehicles. 
Under Utah law, conversion is an "act of interference with a chattel, done without 
lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and 
possession." Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 179 (Utah 1991). While 
conversion involves intentional conduct, it does not require a conscious wrongdoing, but 
"only an intent to exercise dominion and control over the goods inconsistent with the 
owner's right." IcL In the context of secured transactions, if one creditor exercises 
control over certain collateral in the face of a second creditor's superior security interest, 
the first creditor is liable to the second for conversion. See, e.g., Insley, 717 P.2d at 
1344-47. 
a. Volvo Finance had a security interest in all proceeds of 
the Volvo-Financed Vehicles. 
A valid security interest is created when a written security agreement is signed by 
the debtor describing the collateral, value is given by the creditor, and the debtor has 
rights in the collateral. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Utah 
1974). See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-203 (2000).2 Volvo Finance clearly obtained a 
security interest in all inventory owned and acquired by Great Basin when it entered into 
the Security Agreements with each of the Great Basin entities. (See R. 551-56.) The 
inventory is described in the Security Agreements, Volvo Finance gave value by 
advancing funds to purchase the inventory, and Great Basin held the rights to the 
inventory. 
Volvo Finance's security interest also extended to i\\Q proceeds generated by Great 
Basin's sale of commercial trucks financed by Volvo Finance. Indeed, the UCC 
provisions then in effect explicitly stated that a security interest "continues in any 
identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-9-306(2) (2000). Further, the Security Agreements specifically stated that Volvo 
Finance held a security interest in all proceeds received from the disposition of Great 
Basin's inventory. (R. 551.) Accordingly, Volvo Finance holds a security interest in 
Great Basin's collateral as described in the Security Agreements, including all proceeds 
obtained from the disposition of that collateral. 
Additionally, Volvo Finance perfected its security interest in Great Basin's 
collateral and proceeds by filing UCC-1 Financing Statements in the pertinent 
jurisdictions. (See R. 567-69.) Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-9-203, -302, -304 (2000). A 
security interest in proceeds "is a continuously perfected security interest if the interest in 
Except as otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the version of the UCC 
that was in effect in December 2000, when the relevant actions took place. Copies of the 
pertinent sections of the 2000 version of Utah's UCC Article 9 are included in Addendum 
Exhibit 4. 
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the original collateral was perfected . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(3) (2000) 
(emphasis added). As Volvo Finance's security interest in the trucks was perfected by 
filing the UCC-1 Financing Statements, Volvo Finance's security interest in the proceeds 
of those trucks was also perfected. Therefore, Volvo Finance had a perfected purchase 
money security interest in the proceeds received from Great Basin's sale of the Volvo-
Financed Vehicles. 
The basic dispute in this case is whether Volvo Finance or Wells Fargo had 
superior rights to the funds that Great Basin transferred into the Concentration Account 
on December 29, 2000. Regarding the portion of those funds that were traceable to the 
sale of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles, the law clearly favors Volvo Finance. 
b. Volvo Finance's interest in traceable proceeds was 
superior to any interest Wells Fargo claimed. 
Because Volvo Finance had a perfected purchase money security interest in both 
the Volvo-Financed Vehicles and the proceeds thereof, Volvo Finance's interest takes 
precedence over any interest Wells Fargo could possibly claim. The seminal case on this 
issue is Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986) 
(copy included as Addendum Exhibit 5). In Insley, the plaintiff manufacturer sold, on 
credit, a $100,000+ backhoe to one of its retail dealers, Schneider, taking a security 
interest in the backhoe and all proceeds thereof. Schneider sold the backhoe and 
deposited the proceeds into its checking account with Draper Bank. The bank, however, 
had previously advanced funds to Schneider to cover several overdraft checks on that 
account, creating a negative balance. When Schneider deposited the proceeds from the 
backhoe sale, the bank credited the deposit to the account and then took those funds to 
repay itself for the overdrafts. Schneider was thus unable to repay Insley the money it 
owed on the backhoe and filed bankruptcy a few months later. 
Insley sued the Bank for conversion of the proceeds of the backhoe. The trial 
court granted summary judgment in Insley's favor, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. 
First, the court explained that because Insley entered into a security agreement to secure 
the purchase price of the backhoe, filed a UCC-1 financing statement, and delivered the 
backhoe, Insley had a perfected purchase money security interest under Article 9. See id 
at 1343. The court further pointed out that when the backhoe was sold, Insley lost its 
security interest in the backhoe, but "its interest remained in the identifiable cash 
proceeds," and that when the funds were deposited into Schneider's checking account, 
that account "contained, in part, identifiable cash proceeds from the [backhoe] sale." Id. 
The court then concluded that Insley's security interest in the funds took priority 
over the Bank's right to use those funds to repay its advances, reasoning that "Insley's 
purchase money security interest in the proceeds was perfected," while the Bank was 
simply an unsecured creditor. IdL at 1347. The court therefore determined that "the 
Code's priority rules require that Insley's interest must prevail over Draper's right of 
setoff." Id The court noted that under the UCC, "a security agreement is effective 
according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and 
against creditors," and that '"[t]he effect of [Section 9-201] is to give the Article Nine 
secured party, upon a debtor's default, priority over "anyone, anywhere, anyhow" except 
as otherwise provided by the remaining Code priority rules.'" Id. (emphasis added, 
_ io_ 
citation omitted). Accord GMAC v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 18 S.W.3d 337 (Ky. 2000); C& 
H Farm Serv. Co. v. Farmers Sav. Bank, 449 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1989). 
The present case is functionally identical to Insley. Just as the manufacturer did in 
Insley, Volvo Finance loaned funds to a dealer, Great Basin, to enable the dealer to buy 
inventory, pursuant to a security agreement that gave Volvo Finance a security interest in 
the inventory and all proceeds thereof. Just as in Insley, the dealer issued checks for 
which there were insufficient funds in its account, and the bank (in this case Wells Fargo) 
decided to advance funds to the dealer to cover those checks. Finally, just as in Insley, 
the bank decided to take proceeds from the collateral and use those funds to repay the 
dealer's overdraft debt to the bank, notwithstanding that Volvo Finance had a prior 
perfected security interest in those funds. Therefore, just as in Insley, Wells Fargo is 
liable for conversion. 
c. Volvo Finance's Tracing Analysis. 
The extent of Volvo Finance's claim depends on its ability to trace proceeds of 
Great Basin's sales of the 53 Volvo-Financed Vehicles into the $900,000 Great Basin 
transferred to Wells Fargo on December 29, 2000. Volvo Finance's tracing analysis 
(Add. Ex. 2; also inserted in the pocket inside the back cover) shows that the December 
29 transfer included roughly $693,000 in traceable proceeds. As shown on the Analysis 
(in the "Total Beginning Balance" line across the top of the page), the Concentration 
Account (Account 409-8328487) held $2,989,075 at the start of business on December 
21, 2000. Of these funds, $1,691,585 were proceeds traceable to the sale of 25 of the 
Volvo-Financed Vehicles (printed in red ink and identified as "Trust Money").3 The 
remaining $1,297,489 constituted non-proceeds (black ink). On December 21, Great 
Basin transferred $1.5 million from the Concentration Account to the newly created First 
Security Account. (These funds were not received into the First Security Account until 
the next day.) On December 22, Great Basin deposited $100,334 in proceeds into the 
Concentration Account (from the sale of another Vehicle) and transferred another 
$500,000 from the Concentration Account to the First Security Account.4 When those 
transfers were complete, $661,274 was left in the Concentration Account (as shown by 
the "Ending Balance" line for December 22). By December 26, Great Basin had fully 
depleted the funds left in the Concentration Account. 
Because Great Basin kept control over the funds transferred to the First Security 
Account, Mr. Judd concluded that all sales proceeds in the Concentration Account on 
December 21 and 22 were included in the $2 million transferred to the First Security 
Account. (When some funds are spent and some retained, LIBR presumes that trust 
funds were retained.) Therefore, the $2 million transfer included $1,791,919 in proceeds 
Wells Fargo disputes Volvo Finance's conclusions as to what portion of the 
account balance constituted proceeds. That dispute is not material to the present discus-
sion, however, because the discussion is for illustrative and background purposes only. 
4
 These transfers are somewhat difficult to follow on the Tracing Analysis. The 
table on the top of the Tracing Analysis addresses the Wells Fargo Concentration 
Account. The first $1.5 million transferred out appears as a negative entry in the 
12/21/00 column. Because the Tracing Analysis concludes that these funds were 
comprised entirely of sales proceeds, the "(1,500,000)" is in red ink. The second 
$500,000 is shown as two negative entries in the 12/22 column: "(291,919)" in red, i.e., 
proceeds, and "(208,081)" in black. 
The bottom table shows the First Security Account. Because the entire $2 million 
arrived in the First Security Account on December 22, the combined transfer is shown as 
two positive entries on the 12/22 column: "1,791,919" in red, and "208,081" in black. 
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(the $1,691,585 in proceeds that were already in the Concentration Account on December 
21, plus the additional $100,334 deposited into that account on December 22). Thus, as 
of the end of the day on December 22, the First Security Account held $1,791,919 in 
proceeds. 
On December 27, Great Basin deposited $32,630 from the sale of one more truck 
directly into the First Security Account, bringing the total proceeds in the First Security 
Account to $1,824,549 ($1,791,919 + $32,630). 
As of the start of business on December 29, the First Security Account had a 
balance of $2,230,002, including that $1,824,549 in proceeds and $405,453 in non-
proceeds. That day, Great Basin deposited another $1,882,967 in proceeds (from the sale 
of 26 Volvo-Financed Vehicles) directly into the First Security Account, bringing the 
total proceeds in the account to $3,707,516 ($1,824,549 + $1,882,967). Additional non-
proceeds went in and out of the account that day, so that prior to the $900,000 transfer 
back to the Concentration Account, the First Security Account held $3,914,385, including 
$3,707,516 in proceeds and $206,868 in non-proceeds.5 When Great Basin transferred 
the $900,000 back to the Concentration Account, the transfer included all $206,868 in 
non-proceeds, plus $693,132 in proceeds.6 (The remaining $3,014,385 in proceeds 
5
 Because of rounding, the figures in the Tracing Analysis do not always match up 
precisely. Also, the figures stated here in the text do not directly appear in the Tracing 
Analysis because the analysis shows the balances in the accounts after the $900,000 was 
transferred. The Tracing Analysis shows $1,824,549 in proceeds in the account at the 
start of December 29, plus the $1,882,967 deposited that day, adding up to the 
$3,707,516 in proceeds mentioned in the text. 
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 Because the $900,000 transferred on December 29 from the First Security 
Account to the Concentration Account was immediately dissipated, Volvo Finance and 
stayed in the First Security Account, were traced to Zions Bank, and, to a large extent, 
were ultimately recovered by Volvo Finance.) Thus, Volvo Finance is suing Wells Fargo 
for the $693,132 in proceeds transferred to the Concentration Account and seized by 
Wells Fargo. 
d. Wells Fargo's Treatment. 
Wells Fargo, however, contends that the December 21 and 22 transfers included, 
at most, only $1,066,584 in proceeds. (See R. 1276, Add. Ex. 6.) Wells Fargo asserts 
that under LIBR, the first funds taken out of a commingled account are assumed to be 
free of a creditor's security interest, even if the debtor retains control and possession of 
those funds. Thus, under Wells Fargofs view, the funds transferred on December 21 and 
22 must be treated, to the greatest extent possible, as if they included all raw-proceeds. 
Because there were $933,416 in non-proceeds in the account at the time, Wells Fargo 
asserts that the $2 million transferred includes those $933,416 in non-proceeds, with the 
remainder ($1,066,584) treated as proceeds subject to Volvo Finance's interest. All other 
Wells Fargo agree that under LIBR, the transfer is deemed to include any non-proceeds 
that were then in the First Security Account, with any remainder made up by proceeds. 
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 Wells Fargo's modified tracing analysis, Addendum Exhibit 6, is difficult to read, 
but Wells Fargo's conclusions can be derived from Volvo Finance's Tracing Analysis 
(Add. Ex. 2), as follows. As noted in the text, the Concentration Account held 
$1,297,489 in non-proceeds (black ink) at the start of the day on December 21. During 
that day, four deposits of non-proceeds were made into the Concentration Account 
($29,099, $9,180, $1,789, and $2,500), and $406,641 was disbursed from the Account, 
bringing the total non-proceeds to $933,416. Wells Fargo asserts that all of these non-
proceeds were included in the December 21 transfer of $1,500,000 to the First Security 
Account. Volvo Finance, on the other hand, asserts that these non-proceeds remained in 
the Concentration Account, which is why the "non-proceeds" balance at the start of 
December 22 was $933,415. (Once again, numbers do not match up exactly because of 
rounding.) 
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funds in the Concentration Account on December 21 subject to Volvo Finance's interest 
stayed in that account and were lost when that account was dissipated. 
Wells Fargo thus asserts that on December 29, prior to the $900,000 transfer, the 
First Security Account included, at most, $2,982,181 in proceeds,8 with the remaining 
$932,203 as non-proceeds. Id So when Great Basin transferred $900,000, that transfer 
included only non-proceeds, and all proceeds remained in the First Security Account. 
Under this approach, Wells Fargo would not have received any funds subject to Volvo 
Finance's interest, and as such Volvo Finance would have no claim. 
The parties' respective treatments of the December 21-22 transfers, and the effect 
of those treatments, are set forth in the following table (proceeds shown in bold): 
Volvo Finance 
Wells Fargoy 
Dec. 21-22 Transfers 






Dec. 29 Balance in 







Dec. 29 Transfer to 






Once again, the parties agree that $1,915,597 ($32,630 + $1,882,967) in proceeds 
was deposited into the First Security Account on December 27 and 29. The parties also 
agree that when Great Basin transferred $900,000 from the First Security Account to the 
8
 The $1,066,584 transferred on December 21 and 22, plus the $32,630 deposited 
on December 27 and the $1,882,967 deposited on December 29. 
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 Wells Fargofs expert raised other challenges to Volvo Financed conclusions 
regarding the amount of sales proceeds that were in the relevant accounts at any given 
time. The numbers presented in the table, and in the discussion in the text, represent 
Wells Fargo's position for purposes of the summary judgment motion only. 
Concentration Account on December 29 and immediately dissipated the funds, LIBR pre-
sumes that the transfer included all non-proceeds then in the First Security Account. 
Thus, while following all of the numbers may be dizzying, the controlling question on 
appeal is rather straightforward: When Great Basin transferred the $2 million from the 
Concentration Account to the First Security Account and dissipated the funds left in the 
Concentration Account, should the transferred funds be treated as including primarily 
proceeds, or primarily non-proceeds? Put another way, to the extent the funds in the 
Concentration Account prior to those transfers were subject to Volvo Finance's security 
interest, did the transfer to the First Security Account preserve Volvo Finance's interest, 
or defeat that interest? 
2. The Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule (LIBR). 
As shown in the preceding sections, both Volvo Finance and Wells Fargo purport 
to apply LIBR, the commonly accepted (and governing in Utah) rule, originally 
developed for trust law, for tracing funds out of a commingled account. LIBR relies on 
two basic presumptions. First, when a trustee commingles trust funds and personal (non-
trust) funds, and then spends some of the commingled money, the law ordinarily pre-
sumes that the trustee spends his personal funds first, thus preserving the trust funds to 
the greatest extent possible. Second, if trust funds are depleted, they are not usually 
replenished by subsequent deposits of the trustee's personal funds or funds from a third 
party. See, e.g., Tooele County Bd. of Educ. v. Hadlock, 79 Utah 478, 11 P.2d 320, 324-
25 (1932). So, for example, if a trustee mixes $50 of trust money and $50 of his own 
money in an account, and then writes a $50 check for dinner, the law presumes (under the 
first presumption) that he has spent his own money, and the $50 remaining in the account 
is subject to the trust. But if the trustee writes another $10 check for dessert, the extra 
$10 must come from the trust funds, because once the first $50 has been spent, the only 
money left is trust money. Thus, under this situation, the trust fund is reduced to $40. If 
the trustee then gets another $60 from an outside source, and deposits that into the ac-
count, that deposit would not replenish the trust money (under the second presumption), 
so the trust would still be limited to $40. The trust is thus limited to the "lowest inter-
mediate balance" between the time of the commingling and the time the funds are 
recovered or paid, i.e., $40. Volvo Finance believes that Wells Fargo would agree so far. 
Wells Fargofs motion raised the issue of how to treat retentive transfers. That is, if 
the trustee transfers money from one account to another, and then spends the money re-
maining in the first account, are the funds in the second account trust money or personal 
funds? Wells Fargo contends that the first LIBR presumption (expenditures are deemed 
to be taken from non-trust money first) should be applied every time funds are taken from 
an account, even if the funds are not spent or otherwise dissipated. Under Wells Fargofs 
view, a withdrawal of funds must be treated the same as an expenditure of funds, even if 
the trustee actually maintains complete control over the funds. Thus, Wells Fargo con-
tends that the December 21-22 transfers included all non-proceeds then in the 
Concentration Account. 
According to the authorities that have actually addressed this issue, however, the 
first LIBR presumption applies only when funds are dissipated. If a trustee or debtor 
does not dissipate funds withdrawn from a commingled account, but instead maintains 
possession of the funds or their product (in cash, in another account, or by investing in 
other assets), the withdrawal does not defeat the beneficiary's or creditor's interest. Thus, 
when the $2 million was transferred on December 21 and 22 and kept in the First Secur-
ity Account, while the Concentration Account was immediately dissipated, the trans-
ferred funds kept their status as "proceeds" of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles and remained 
subject to Volvo Finance's security interest. 
3. The Law: Under LIBR, Volvo Finance's security interest remained 
in the funds transferred from the Concentration Account to the First 
Security Account. 
a. Cases and other authorities recognize that the first 
presumption of LIBR does not apply unless funds are 
dissipated. 
Utah law has long recognized that where trust funds are converted into another 
form of property, the trust extends to that property, and to all proceeds of that property, 
even if the trust funds were commingled with the trustee's own money: 
"The doctrine of equity, as regards property disposed of by persons in a 
fiduciary position, is that, whether the disposition of it be rightful or 
wrongful, the beneficial owner is entitled to the proceeds, whatever be 
their form, provided only he can identify them. If they cannot be 
identified, by reason of the trust money being mingled with that of the 
trustee, then the cestui que trust is entitled to a charge upon the new 
investment to the extent of the trust money traceable into it; that there is 
no distinction between an express trustee and an agent, or bailee, or 
collector of rents, or anybody else in a fiduciary position; and that there is 
no difference between investments in the purchase of lands, or chattels, or 
bonds, or loans, or moneys deposited in a bank account." 
Waddell v. Waddell 36 Utah 435, 104 P. 743, 749 (1909) (emphasis added) (quoting 
National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U.S. 54, 68 (1881)). Thus, the court in Waddell 
held that the claimant's interest included not only funds that the defendant wrongfully 
obtained from a decedent's estate, but also property the defendant purchased from a 
commingled account. Id. at 750. 
Courts therefore have long recognized that where a trustee (1) commingles trust 
funds and personal funds in an account; (2) transfers some of those funds to another 
account or form; and then (3) dissipates the funds left in the first account, the transferred 
funds remain impressed with the trust. For example, more than one hundred years ago, 
the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the plaintiff had a right to trace its funds to 
certain warrants a bank had purchased out of a commingled account, even though the 
bank subsequently depleted that account. See City of Lincoln v. Morrison, 90 N.W. 905 
(Neb. 1902) (Add. Ex. 7). In Lincoln, about a week after the plaintiff city purchased a 
certificate of deposit from the bank, the bank used $1,750 in cash to purchase certain 
"state warrants." Eight months after that, the bank suspended operations. When it 
suspended operations, the bank had depleted its cash, but the receiver recovered $3,300 
from selling the warrants. Id. at 906. 
The court rejected the receiver's argument, identical to Wells Fargo's, that the 
funds used to buy the warrants should be presumed to be the bank's own money, because 
those funds were the first "withdrawn" from the commingled account. Instead, the court 
held that the first presumption of LIBR applies only to funds that are dissipated: 
The receiver contends that since there was over $40,000 in cash in the bank 
at the time, of which but $6,000 belonged to the city, it will be presumed 
that the $1,750 [withdrawn to purchase the warrants] was the bank's own 
money. Such would be the case, without doubt, had the bank withdrawn 
the money and dissipated it in some fashion. But it did not do this. It 
merely changed the form of a portion of the fund in which the city's 
money had been wrongfully mixed. 
Id. at 909 (emphasis added). Because the funds were not dissipated, but were instead 
used to buy the warrants, the city had a claim to the $3,300 generated by selling the 
warrants, in preference to the bank's general creditors: 
In accordance with the presumption that whatever was retained and not 
dissipated was the city's money, and not the bank's, these warrants and 
their proceeds in the hands of the receiver represent money to which the 
city has a prior claim, and in which general creditors have no right to share. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Brennan v. Tillinghast 201 F. 609 (6th Cir. 1913) (Add. Ex. 8), the 
Ironwood Bank wrongfully sold the plaintiffs stock and deposited the $3,500 in proceeds 
in that bank's own account with a second bank, the Duluth Bank. Over the ensuing seven 
days, the Ironwood Bank withdrew $2,800 from the Duluth account and put the cash into 
its own vault.10 Throughout this time, the Duluth account always contained more than 
$3,500. A few days later, the Duluth account was fully depleted, and the Ironwood Bank 
soon closed. Cash remained in the Ironwood Bank's vault, however, and the plaintiff 
asserted a right to have the wrongfully sold stock proceeds repaid out of that cash. Id. at 
611-12. 
Once again, as Wells Fargo does in the present case, the bank's receiver argued 
that the plaintiff could not trace his funds from the Duluth account to the bank's vault, 
because as the first money taken out of the Duluth account, the $2,800 transferred to the 
vault was presumed to be the bank's own money, not the plaintiffs. Under the receiver's 
The transfer was actually made through the use of cash drafts. 
theory, the plaintiffs funds remained in the Duluth account after the transfers were 
complete and were therefore lost when that account was depleted. Id. at 612-13. 
The court, just like in Lincoln, acknowledged the presumption that "the sums first 
drawn out were from the moneys which the tort-feasor had a right to expend in his own 
business, and that the balance which remained included the trust fund, which he had no 
right to use." Id. at 614. But as in Lincoln, the court concluded that "this rule of 
presumption has no application where the evidence shows that the first moneys drawn out 
of the mingled fund by the tort-feasor were not in fact dissipated by him at all, but were 
merely transferred, in a substituted form, to another fund retained in his own 
possession" IcL (emphasis added). Instead, the court held that the plaintiff could trace 
his funds into the bank's remaining cash: "[T]he right to follow the trust in such form is 
not lost by reason of the fact that the tort-feasor thereafter draws out and spends for his 
own purposes the balance of the fund in which the trust money was originally mingled." 
Id 
The Brennan court (and many others) relied heavily on a seminal 1903 English 
case, In re Oatway, 2 Ch. Div. 356 (Add. Ex. 9). In Oatway, the decedent had wrongfully 
used funds from a commingled account to purchase stock and then dissipated the rest of 
the account. Again, as in the present case, if the funds taken from the account were 
deemed the decedent's personal funds (as Wells Fargo claims here), so that the claimant's 
funds stayed in the account and were later dissipated, the trust would be extinguished and 
the claimant left with a personal unsecured claim against the decedent's estate. But if the 
funds taken from the account were deemed trust funds (as Volvo Finance maintains), the 
claimant would be able to trace the funds to the stock and to the proceeds of their sale. 
The court ruled in favor of the claimant, reasoning that "when any of the money drawn 
out has been invested, and the investment remains in the name or under the control of the 
trustee, the rest of the balance having afterwards been dissipated by him, he cannot 
maintain that the investment which remains represents his own money alone, and that 
what has been spent and can no longer be traced and recovered was the money 
belonging to the trust." Id. at 360 (emphasis added).11 
The principles established by these cases are recognized as controlling. For 
example, the Restatement of Restitution explains that where a wrongdoer "makes 
withdrawals from the [commingled] bank account which are preserved or can be traced, 
and subsequently withdraws and dissipates the balance of the deposit, the claimant can 
enforce an equitable lien on the part withdrawn or its product." Restatement of 
Restitution § 211, cmt. c, at 852 (1937) (emphasis added). Applying this principle to the 
lowest intermediate balance rule, section 212 of the Restatement of Restitution states that 
11
 Several other courts have recognized that the first presumption of LIBR does not 
apply when funds are transferred or otherwise not dissipated. See, e.g., In re Pacat Fin. 
Corp., 27 F.2d 810, 813 (2d Cir. 1928) (the "applicable principle" is set forth in Oatwav; 
also citing Brennan and Lincoln); Mitchell v. Dunn, 294 P. 386, 389 (Cal. 1931) ("The 
law will not permit the trustee to say that the only permanent investment made with 
moneys from the fund was with personal funds, and that the dissipated funds belonged to 
the cestui."); Republic Supply Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 79 F.2d 375, 377-78 (9th Cir. 
1935) (following Brennan and Oatwav); In re Erie Trust Co., 191 A. 613, 617-18 (Pa. 
1937) (following Oatway and Restatement of Trusts § 202(1)); Central Prod. Credit Assfn 
v. Hans, 545 N.E.2d 1063, 1073-74 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (recognizing under Restatement 
of Restitution § 212, cmt. d, that LIBR does not apply "where the money withdrawn or 
traceable proceeds of that money are redeposited"); In re Goldberg, 168 B.R. 382, 385 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he presumption will not be applied to the disadvantage of the 
beneficiary."). 
a trust fund is depleted only when a person "makes withdrawals from the mingled fund 
and dissipates the money so withdrawn." Id. § 212 (emphasis added) (Add. Ex. 10). A 
comment to section 212 further explains that the rule "is not applicable where the money 
withdrawn or traceable proceeds of that money are redeposited. If the money withdrawn 
from the account is subsequently redeposited in the account, the effect is the same as 
though the withdrawal had not been made, and the claimant's lien is not limited to the 
lowest intermediate balance." Id § 212, cmt. d (emphasis added). See also Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts § 202 (1959); Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 928 (Rev. 2d 
ed. 1982) (discussing cases following Oatway); Austin W. Scott, The Right to Follow 
Money Wrongfully Mingled With Other Money, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 125(1913). 
Given the foregoing, the trial court clearly erred in stating that there was f,no 
authority'1 for Volvo Finance's position. (Order, Add. Ex. 1, at R. 2213.) To the 
contrary, Lincoln, Brennan, Oatway, the Restatement of Trusts, the Restatement of 
Restitution, Bogert's treatise, the Harvard Law Review, and the other cases cited above 
certainly constitute "authority" that transactions that dissipate funds are treated differently 
from transactions that preserve funds. As such, Volvo Finance is not seeking to 
"eliminate the rules for tracing." (Cf. id.) Volvo Finance is merely asking that the 
tracing rules be applied just as they have been for more than a century. 
b. Adopting Wells Fargo's view would defeat the very 
purpose of the tracing rules. 
The Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway rule is supported by the very considerations that led 
to the development of tracing rules in the first place. The presumption that withdrawals 
are deemed to include non-trust funds first is based on a legal fiction that a trustee is 
presumed to act properly; if a trustee withdraws and spends part of a commingled fund 
and preserves the rest, the law presumes to the greatest extent possible that the trustee 
was spending his own money and preserving the beneficiary's. See, e.g., Hadlock, 11 
P.2d at 325 ('The presumption is that men act honestly; that when a trustee mingles trust 
money with his own, and then draws out sums from a common fund by check or 
otherwise, it will be presumed that he drew out his own in preference to the trust 
money."). But where a trustee simply transfers one part of a commingled fund into a new 
account, and then spends the money left remaining in the first account, application of the 
"trustee acts properly" presumption supports the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway rule. If the 
law presumes that the trustee preserves trust funds to the greatest extent possible, then the 
law must presume that the trust funds were transferred to and preserved in the new 
account. 
Similarly, the purpose of LIBR is to protect the beneficiary's rights to the funds to 
the greatest extent possible. See, e.g., CO. Funk & Sons v. Sullivan Equip., 431 N.E.2d 
370, 372 (111. 1982) ("[T]he lowest-intermediate-balance rule directs that Funk's proceeds 
in Sullivan's account are preserved to the greatest extent possible as the account is 
depleted."). Indeed, that is the point of the presumption that the trustee spends his own 
money first: Doing so presumes that the trust money is spent last, i.e., as little as 
possible. But again, where some funds are transferred to a new account and the rest 
spent, the purposes of LIBR are best achieved by applying the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway 
rule, i.e., by presuming that the funds transferred to the new account are subject to the 
trust. 
C- Wells Fargofs position is unsupported by law or logic. 
Wells Fargo cited no authority below expanding LIBR to cover retentive transfers. 
Instead, Wells Fargo relied primarily on a Utah bankruptcy case stating, without analysis, 
that the first funds "removed" from an account are treated as non-trust funds under LIBR. 
(See R. 883 (citing In re JD Serv., Inc., 284 B.R. 292, 298 (Bankr. D. Utah 2002).) Wells 
Fargo also cited two additional bankruptcy cases repeating the general proposition that 
when a commingled fund is "dissipated," the trust fund is also dissipated. (See id. (citing 
Schuyler v. LittlefiekL 232 U.S. 707, 711-12 (1914); Turley v. Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 
817 F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1987).) Finally, Wells Fargo cited two old Utah cases for 
the proposition that if a claimant cannot trace the funds at issue, then the claimant loses 
its special rights to those funds. (R. 832-33 (citing Kent v. Kent, 50 Utah 44, 165 P. 271, 
272 (Utah 1917); Hadlock, 11 P.2d at 324-25).) 
These cases are inapplicable because they do not deal with the situation presented 
here, where the funds were transferred between accounts held by the trustee/debtor. In 
fact, those cases actually support Volvo Finance's position. For example, in Hadlock, the 
court allowed the plaintiff to trace funds into two separate accounts simultaneously, the 
insolvent bank's own vault and that bank's account with a larger bank. See Hadlock, 11 
P.2d at 325-26. The court also recognized that when the trustee is insolvent, "[t]here is a 
presumption ... that what remains at the time of insolvency is a trust fund. The law 
presumes that trust funds were not appropriated and that a balance of cash in the hands 
of the depositary is the trust funds" Id. at 325 (emphasis added, internal quotation and 
citation omitted). Similarly, the In re JD Services bankruptcy court, allowed a bank that 
had erroneously credited a large deposit to the debtor to trace the funds when they were 
transferred to a new account. See In re JD Serv., 284 B.R. at 298-99. 
Wells Fargo's position is illogical as well. There is no good reason why a 
creditor's rights in funds held by a debtor should depend on which account the debtor 
used to keep the funds. If a debtor commingles $50 of secured proceeds with $50 of its 
own funds, transfers half of the money to a new account, and then writes a $50 check for 
dinner, why should it matter if the check is drawn on the second account or on the first? 
Under either scenario, the debtor still would have $50 of the funds remaining, traceable to 
the commingled account, enough to satisfy the creditor's claim. 
Wells Fargo asks this Court to exalt form over substance by treating funds held in 
two accounts differently from funds held in a single account and by holding that a 
secured creditor's ability to trace depends on whether the debtor had kept the funds in the 
same account, transferred funds between accounts and back, or withdrawn the funds and 
redeposited them. Indeed, as Mr. Judd pointed out in his deposition, Wells Fargo's 
preferred approach would allow a debtor to destroy a security interest simply by 
transferring funds from one account to another and back. (See R. 836.) The 
Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway rule ignores such trivialities and instead focuses on the 
substantive question of whether the debtor maintained control of the funds or their 
product. 
d. Summary. 
The cases, the restatements, and the other authorities agree: Under LIBR, when 
trust funds are placed into a commingled account, and when funds from that account are 
withdrawn but retained, with the account then being depleted, the beneficiary or creditor 
does not lose his interest in the trust funds still in the trustee's possession. Thus, as a 
matter of law, when Great Basin transferred $2 million from the Concentration Account 
to the First Security Account, and then spent the rest of the money in the Concentration 
Account, Volvo Finance's security interest in the funds was not defeated; instead, that 
security interest continued in the funds as they remained in the First Security Account. 
As such, the trial court erred in concluding that the funds transferred back to the 
Concentration Account on December 29 did not include proceeds traceable to the sale of 
any of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles. The Judgment should therefore be reversed. 
B. The alternative grounds Wells Fargo raised below would not support 
summary judgment against Volvo Finance. 
Because the trial court ruled that the transfer between Great Basin accounts 
defeated Volvo Finance's claim to the funds at issue, the court did not address the two 
alternative grounds Wells Fargo raised in support of its motion for summary judgment. 
The first alternative ground Wells Fargo raised was that under Revised Article 9, Volvo 
Finance is required to prove "collusion" between Wells Fargo and Great Basin in order to 
prevail. The second ground is that even if the pre-revised Article 9 governs, Volvo 
Finance's claim is barred by the "ordinary course" defense that is mentioned in a 
comment to former UCC 9-306(2), Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(2). Both arguments 
should be rejected. 
1. Revised Article 9 does not apply because it was not in effect in 
December 2000. 
First, Revised Article 9, which placed additional requirements on a secured 
creditor in order to maintain priority against a bank, does not apply to the present case. 
Revised Article 9, by its own terms, did not go into effect until July 1, 2001, and the 
conversion at issue here happened in December 2000. Revised Article 9 expressly states 
that it does not affect relative priorities that were established prior to July 2001: 
This act determines the priority of conflicting claims to collateral. 
However, if the relative priorities of the claims were established before 
this act takes effect, former Chapter 9 determines priority, 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-709(l) (emphasis added). This statute "serves as a grandfather 
clause, protecting interests that enjoyed priority under former Article 9 but would lose 
that status under the revised provisions. It ensures that 'the mere taking effect of [revised 
Article 9] does not of itself adversely affect the priority of conflicting claims to 
collateral."1 Interbusiness Bank v. First Nat'l Bank of Mifflintown, 318 F. Supp. 2d 230, 
238 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (emphasis added, bracketed material in original, citations omitted). 
Revised Article 9 requires a creditor to obtain "control" over a debtor's bank 
account to preserve its priority over a setting-off bank: "The exercise by a bank of a set-
off against a deposit account is ineffective against a secured party that holds a security 
interest in the deposit account which is perfected by control under Subsection 70A-9-
104(l)(c), if the set-off is based on a claim against the debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-
9a-340(3) (emphasis added). A secured creditor may obtain "control" of a deposit 
account by entering into an agreement with the bank or by "becoming] the bank's cus-
tomer with respect to the deposit account." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-104(l)(a), (b). 
The control requirement did not exist under former Article 9. 
In Interbusiness Bank, the court held that former Article 9 governed a priority dispute 
between creditors whose interests were perfected in February and May 2001, 
respectively, even though the lawsuit was not filed until 2003 and involved a liquidation 
that occurred after the Revised Article took effect. See id, at 239-40. Here, whatever 
rights Wells Fargo and Volvo Finance had in Great Basin's funds were established on 
December 29, 2000, the day Wells Fargo seized the funds from Great Basin's account. 
Therefore, former Article 9 controls. 
In Utah, statutes do not operate retroactively; instead, the law in effect at the time 
of the events in question governs liability for those events. See, e.g., WebBank v. 
American Gen'l Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, % 5 n.3, 54 P.3d 1139. Indeed, 
retroactively applying Revised Article 9 in this situation would be especially unfair to 
Volvo Finance and other creditors. As mentioned in footnote 12 above, Revised Article 9 
instituted new procedures for a creditor to maintain control over debtor's use of proceeds, 
e.g., by obtaining "control" over a deposit account. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-
104(1). But Revised Article 9 gave creditors until July 1, 2001, to take such steps. It 
would be unfair to hold Volvo Finance to the new requirements of the Revised Article 9 
before that article even went into effect. 
2. Summary judgment cannot be justified by the purported "ordinary 
course" defense of Comment 2(c). 
Wells Fargo's second alternative ground below was that the so-called "ordinary 
course" defense, which appears in a comment to former UCC 9-306, allows Wells Fargo 
to take the proceeds of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles free and clear of Volvo Finance's 
undisputed superior security interest. (Volvo Finance's motion for partial summary 
judgment also raised the same issue, asking the trial court to strike two "ordinary course11 
affirmative defenses.) 
As noted above, former UCC 9-306(2) states that a security interest in collateral 
"continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by a debtor." Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(2) (2000) (Add. Ex. 4). Comment 2(c) to former UCC 9-306 
states as follows: 
Where cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's checking account and 
paid out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients of the funds of 
course take free of any claim which the secured party may have in them as 
proceeds. What has been said relates to payments and transfers in ordinary 
course. The law of fraudulent conveyances would no doubt in appropriate 
cases support recovery of proceeds by a secured party from a transferee out 
of ordinary course or otherwise in collusion with the debtor to defraud the 
secured party. 
Former UCC 9-306, cmt. 2(c). Relying primarily on three out-of-state cases,13 Wells 
Fargo argued that under the ordinary course defense, Volvo Finance would have to prove 
either that Wells Fargo knew, or that Wells Fargo recklessly disregarded, that Great 
Basin's "payment" of the proceeds to Wells Fargo violated Volvo Finance's security 
interest. Wells Fargo insisted that because Wells Fargo seized the funds from the 
Concentration Account without knowing that Volvo Finance had an interest in those 
funds, Volvo Finance's claims should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
u
 Textron Fin. Corp. v. Firstar Bank Wis., 579 N.W.2d 48 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998); 
J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 991 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1993); Harley-
Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England, 897 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1990). 
The ordinary course defense must be rejected for two reasons. First, the defense 
does not even apply in Utah in this kind of case. Second, even if the defense could apply, 
Wells Fargo has not established that the defense does apply. 
a. The ordinary course defense as a matter of law cannot 
apply to the present facts. 
(i) Utah law precludes the defense. 
First, a defense based on a "comment" simply cannot trump the plain language of 
the UCC statutes. As noted above, UCC 9-306(2), which was enacted by the Utah 
legislature, plainly states that a security interest in collateral includes identifiable 
proceeds of that collateral. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(2). Adopting the ordinary 
course defense would enable a comment to take precedence over the plain language of a 
statute. This would not be appropriate. 
Second, this case is controlled by Insley, and the principles behind the ordinary 
course defense are inconsistent with those expressed in Insley. 717 P.2d 1341 (Add. Ex. 
5). As discussed earlier, Insley held that when a debtor deposits funds into an overdrawn 
account, and the bank uses those funds to repay itself for an overdraft advance, the bank 
is liable for conversion if the funds were proceeds in which a creditor had a perfected 
security interest. The Utah Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]he purpose and concept of 
notice filing would be significantly weakened if we held that [a bank] is not bound by 
that which it would have discovered through a proper inquiry." Id at 1345. The court 
further explained that one of the purposes of Article 9 "is to relieve creditors from the 
age-old requirement of policing collateral in the hands of a debtor. Adoption of the 
minority approach [allowing a bank to take priority] places such a duty on creditors and 
'would severely undercut significant values of certainty, efficiency, and reliance which 
are at the heart of the Codal emphasis on public filing.'" Id. at 1346 (citation omitted). 
Instead, "[a] secured party should be able to rely on his compliance with the Code's 
requirements for perfection and his search of the record as against an unrecorded 
interest of a setting-off bank." Id. (emphasis added). 
To allow an "ordinary course" defense on the facts of this case, i.e., to require 
Volvo Finance to establish knowledge or recklessness by Wells Fargo, the Court would 
have to conclude that Volvo Finance's UCC-1 filings were not enough to put Wells Fargo 
on notice of Volvo Finance's interest in the proceeds of the Vehicles, and that Volvo 
Finance was required to take additional steps, beyond the filing, to protect its rights. 
Insley precludes such reasoning. Indeed, under Wells Fargo's view, the only way a 
secured creditor could protect its interest would be to physically prevent delivery of 
inventory until payment was received. But once again, imposing such a requirement 
would contradict the Utah Supreme Court's recognition in Insley that the purpose of Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-9-205 is to relieve creditors of the "age-old requirement of policing 
collateral in the hands of a debtor." Insley, 717 P.2d at 1346. Volvo Finance respectfully 
submits that there is no way the Court can adopt the "ordinary course" defense and still 
remain faithful to Insley.14 
14
 Perhaps recognizing this problem, Wells Fargo attempted below to distinguish 
Insley by denying that Wells Fargo exercised a "setoff." (R. 2164-66.) But the use of the 
deposited funds to offset the prior "negative balance" is the very epitome of a setoff, and 
any attempt to distinguish Insley would be futile. 
Finally, the only Utah Supreme Court case discussing the ordinary course defense, 
while not directly on point, appears to bar any attempt to apply the ordinary course 
defense in this case. See J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales King Int'L 2000 UT 92, 17 P.3d 1100. 
In Simplot a vendor sold the debtor's crops but used the proceeds to pay itself for 
commissions and other expenses. The debtor's financer, who had a superior security 
interest in the crops and proceeds, sued for conversion. Among other things, the vendor 
claimed a right to the proceeds under the "ordinary course" defense of Comment 2(c). Id 
fflf 39-42. The court noted that Comment 2(c) had never been adopted in Utah, and that it 
did not need to consider whether to adopt Comment 2(c) because that comment simply 
did not apply. Id, 140. The Simplot court relied on the fact that the debtor in that case 
did not exercise control over the funds at issue; rather, the vendor received the funds from 
the crop sales and paid those funds to itself. IcL ^ 42. That fact distinguishes Simplot 
from the present case. The rest of the court's reasoning is instructive, however: 
This situation more closely resembles a conflict between a perfected 
security interest and a right of setoff See Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper 
Bank & Trust 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986) (ruling that perfected 
security interest prevails over a right of setoff); First Sec. Bank of Utah v. 
Utah Turkey Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329, 334 (Utah 1980) (holding that 
setoff was improper). Therefore, Comment 2(c) is inapplicable and the 
district court did not err in rejecting this argument as a matter of law. 
Id. (emphasis added). In other words, because that case "closely resemble[d]" a conflict 
between a perfected security interest and a setoff, the ordinary course defense did not 
apply. The present case, of course, is a conflict between Volvo Finance's perfected 
security interest and Wells Fargo's setoff. Thus, the ordinary course defense cannot apply 
here, either. 
(ii) Even if Utah law were silent, the weight 
of out-of-state authority rejects the de-
fense in cases such as this. 
Even if Insley did not control, it would still be erroneous for the Court to allow 
Wells Fargo to escape liability for its conversion of Volvo Finance's collateral under the 
"ordinary course" defense of Comment 2(c). In cases involving setoffs to repay overdraft 
advances, courts reject the ordinary course defense. See Bank of Brewton v. GMAC, 811 
F. Supp. 648, 650-51 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (ordinary course defense not shown because "[t]he 
Bank admits that it did not do a UCC search that would have turned up GMAC's prior 
lien"); C & H Farm Serv., 449 N.W.2d at 876-77 (rejecting defense because "the bank's 
payment of Schellhorns' overdrafts constituted unsecured loans from the bank to 
Schellhorns" and "the bank may not loan money to Schellhorns by paying Schellhorns' 
overdrafts and then expect to 'jump over' C & H's priority in identifiable proceeds of C & 
H's collateral"); GMAC v. Lincoln Nat'l 18 S.W.3d at 339-40 (ordinary course defense 
"does not apply when a bank seizes funds deposited in a customer's account and applies 
such funds to payment of overdrafts or antecedent debts. Such an interpretation would 
eviscerate the security interest in proceeds of collateral contrary to [9-306(2)] and 
permit a bank that had made an unsecured loan to leapfrog secured creditors") 
(emphasis added). Even if Insley did not govern, these cases would control. 
It is perfectly appropriate to expect a bank — like any other creditor - to check a 
customer's UCC filings when the bank decides to loan a customer money, as in the 
present case and in Bank of Brewton, C & H Farm Service, and GMAC v. Lincoln 
National. Indeed, by pursuing its "ordinary course" defense, Wells Fargo claims a right 
to loan money to an already overextended customer, without no investigation into the 
customer's creditworthiness, and then to be protected from its own bad decisions by 
jumping ahead of secured creditors and taking repayment from proceeds already pledged 
away. And to make matters worse, by pursuing a defense based on its lack of "actual 
knowledge," Wells Fargo has claimed special rights because of its own failure to 
investigate Great Basin's condition. Allowing this would frustrate the purpose of the 
UCC's filing system. Therefore, even without Insley and Simplot, Wells Fargo's ordinary 
course defense would fail as a matter of law. 
b. Even if an ordinary course defense could apply. Great 
Basin has not, as a matter of law, satisfied the 
requirements for that defense. 
Finally, even if an ordinary course defense could somehow apply to the present 
situation, Wells Fargo did not establish as a matter of law that the defense does apply 
based on the undisputed facts.15 Addressing this issue would require the Court to review 
First, Comment 2(c) refers to funds "paid out" of a checking account, and that is 
not what happened here; Wells Fargo simply set off the deposited funds against the prior 
overdrafts. Second, the application of the ordinary course defense is a question of fact. 
See, e.g., Harley-Davidson, 897 F.2d at 622-23; HCC Credit Corp. v. Springs Valley 
Bank & Trust, 712 N.E.2d 952, 958 (Ind. 1999). In HCC Credit, the court held that the 
"ordinary course" defense depends on "(1) the extent to which the payment was made in 
the routine operation of the debtors business, and (2) the extent to which the recipient 
was aware that it was acting to the prejudice of the secured party." 712 N.E.2d at 956-57. 
The court held that the debtor's payment to the bank was not in the ordinary course 
because the bank was aware that the plaintiff had a perfected security interest in the 
debtor's tractor inventory, and the payment was unusually large. See id, at 959. It is 
Volvo Finance's position that Wells Fargo failed to establish as a matter of law that Great 
Basin's "payment" to Wells Fargo was made in the "routine operation" of Great Basin's 
business. Nor did Wells Fargo establish that it was not aware it was acting to Volvo 
Finance's prejudice in seizing Great Basin's funds on December 29. Indeed, as explained 
in the Statement of Facts, even apart from Volvo Finance's UCC filing, Great Basin had 
the record in detail, however, when the trial court itself has not yet done so on this issue 
(or, if it has, the results of its review did not appear in the Order). Volvo Finance 
respectfully submits that, for the reasons set forth above, this Court should rule that the 
ordinary course defense cannot apply to the present situation, i.e., where a bank exercises 
a setoff to the prejudice of a secured creditor. However, if this Court concludes that Utah 
law allows Wells Fargo to rely on the ordinary course defense, then Volvo Finance 
submits that the best approach would be to remand to the trial court to apply that defense. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, Great Basin did not defeat Volvo Finance's security interest in 
the proceeds of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles by transferring $2 million to the First 
Security Account on December 21 and 22 and depleting the rest of the funds in the 
Concentration Account. Further, Revised Article 9 cannot be applied to bar Volvo 
Finance's claim, as that statute was not in effect when Wells Fargo converted the funds at 
issue. Finally, the ordinary course defense should be rejected as a matter of law, because 
allowing Wells Fargo to escape liability due to its own claimed ignorance of Volvo 
Finance's interest would flatly contradict the unambiguous holdings in Insley, Simplot, 
and the out-of-state cases dealing with overdraft advances. Volvo Finance therefore 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment to Wells Fargo and remand the matter for further proceedings. 
actual knowledge that Volvo Finance likely had a security interest in Great Basin's 
inventory and proceeds, and that the funds Great Basin would be transferring to Wells 
Fargo would likely include such proceeds. (See R. 1004-05.) 
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CIVIL NO. 020905207 
JUDGE LA. DEVER 
This matter came before the Court on cross motions for Summary Judgment. 
The Court heard argument and has reviewed the memoranda and documents submitted 
by the parties. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Volvo Finance LLC The Americas (Volvo) financed the purchase of Volvo 
vehicles by Great Basin Truck Company. 
2. Volvo took a security interest in those trucks. 
3. In the fall of 2000, Great Basin began to experience financial difficulties. 
4. Great Basin maintained a series of operating accounts with Wells Fargo Bank. 
5. The funds deposited with Wells Fargo were a combination of trust funds (from 
the sale of trucks), and non-trust funds (income from other sources). 
6. On or about December 26 through December 29, 2000, Great Basin had 
overdrafts in the Wells Fargo account in the amounts of $281,056 and $828,951. 
7. On December 27, 2000, Great Basin transferred $300,000 to the Wells Fargo 
account from a First Security Bank account. On December 29, 2000, Great Basin 
transferred $900,000 to the Wells Fargo account from the same First Security account. 
8. The sums of money in the Wells Fargo and First Security accounts and the 
amount of transfers between those accounts are not in dispute. 
CLAIM 
Volvo claims that a portion of the $900,000 transferred into the Wells Fargo 
account on December 29th was directly traceable to trust funds received for the sale of 
trucks and therefore belongs to Volvo. 
DISPUTED ISSUES 
There are no material facts in dispute. The issues before the Court deal with a 
legal interpretation of three issues: 
1. Under the Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule (LIBR) can Volvo trace 
any of the monies received by Wells Fargo on December 29th. 
2. Does revised Section 70A-9a-322 require dismissal of the claims 
asserted by Volvo. 
3. If revised §322 does not apply, does Comment 2 (c) of the former §322 
dictate dismissal of the claim made by Volvo. 
For the reason stated below, the Court need not address issues 2 and 3. 
BASIC LAW 
The rules for the tracing of monies in a commingled trust/non-trust account are 
not in dispute and have not been in dispute for generations. The two basic rules that 
apply are 
1. When monies are withdrawn from a commingled account, they are 
deemed to come first from non-trust funds. Only when insufficient non-trust funds exist 
are the trust funds invaded. 
2. Once trust proceeds are removed from the account, they are presumed 
not to be replenished by subsequent deposits of non-denominated monies. 
ANALYSIS 
As previously noted, there is no dispute as to the amount of money in the Wells 
Fargo account and the transfers or amounts from it to First Security and back. The 
dispute centers on the character of the transfers of $1.5 million on December 21st and 
$500,000 on December 22nd. 
Both parties agree that at the start of December 21st there was $1.6+ million of 
trust funds and $1.2+ million of non-trust funds in the Wells Fargo account. Non-trust 
monies were received and spent, reducing the non-trust portion to $933,415.65. Also 
occurring on this day was a transfer of $1.5 million to First Security Bank. It is the 
character of this sum that is in dispute. Volvo claim the entire $1.5 million should come 
from the trust portion of the account. Wells Fargo claims that LIBR rules require that 
$933,415.65 comes from non-trust and the remainder ($566,584.35) comes from the 
trust portion. Volvo argues that the "transfer" of funds versus the spending of funds 
should be treated differently. The Court disagrees that there is or should be a 
difference in the treatment of the funds based upon spending versus transferring. The 
difference, if one exists, is in the manner of the characterization of the removal. Volvo 
argues that since the funds were being transferred all of the transferred monies should 
come from the trust portion. The problem with this view is that there is no authority for 
such a position. To eliminate the rules for tracing based upon a view of how the money 
is allegedly disbursed, transfer versus payment, would undermine the rule. 
The better reasoned approach is to follow the rule. There was available, on 
December 21st, non-trust monies of $933,415.65. Therefore, the first $933,415.65 paid 
to First Security were these non-trust funds. The remaining amount of $566,584.35 was 
from trust funds. First Security had non-trust funds in excess of $900,000 when that 
amount was transferred to Wells Fargo on December 29, 2000. 
Volvo's claim that $693,132 was traceable trust funds is without merit. Summary 
Judgment for Wells Fargo is granted. 
Dated this 11th day of November, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the H day of November, 2005,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, postage prepaid, to the following: 
James S. Jardine 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Stephen P. Horvat 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway, Ste 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Tab 2 
icks FSB Activity for December 2000 
Exhibit 1 
13,372 27.194 63.433 15,438 18,819 29,099 13,321 72,406 8,858 
49,928 33,172 36,632 9,180 






318,956 613,933 134,787 16,450 1,011,385 2,500 653 - 354,348 696 
(232.734) (333.289) (339.909) (531.174) (68.961) (406,641) (78,035) (1.014,735) (1.172,310) (38,915) (125,055) 
$ 597.043 $2.270.574 $2,349,774 $1,991,200 $2,989,075 $1,125,001 $ 661.274 $ (281.056) $ (790,161) $ (828,951) $ (53.310) 
IN TRUCKS - FIRST SECURITY BANK (222-00085-32) 
50,904 455,252 585,936 286,236 405,453 
50,904 2,247,171 2,377,856 2,110,786 2,230,002 $3,014,3* 
208,081 
(300,000) (900,000) 
50,904 196,267 130,685 300 119,217 63,132 
(261,717) 
$ 50,904 $2,247,171 $2,377,856 $2,110,786 $2,230,002 $3,014,385 
Tab 3 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 
PO BOX 63020 
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94163 
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES 
CONCENTRATION ACCT 
2300 S 4000 W 
WEST VALLEY UT 84120 
Page 1 of 8 
Account No: 
Statement Start Date: 




For Customer Assistance: 
Call your Customer Service Officer or Client Services 
1-800-AT WELLS (289-3557) 
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Sweep Dividend Deposit ACH 
Dividend Tra 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4098328529 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4098328602 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4496807488 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4801908138 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4911433407 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4098327406 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4098328529 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4496807488 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4801908138 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4911433407 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4098327406 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4098328529 
ZBA Funding Account 
From 4098328602 
EXHIBIT 1 




















GREAT BASIN COMPANIES 
CONCENTRATION ACCT 
Electronic Deposits/ Bank Credits 
Page 2 of 8 
Account No: 




































































Amount Transaction* Detail 
64,549.8 6 ZBA Funding Account Tr« „.. 
From 4098328644 
431,012.77 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4178529582 
19,988.77 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4801908138 
414,555.14 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4911433407 
63,768.81 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098327406 
102,980.75 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
50,136.08 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328644 
38,200.54 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4496807488 
2,767.69 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4801908138 
937.83 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4911433407 
86,757.28 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098327406 
325,000.00 Over The Counter Deposit 
38,777.64 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
42,751.2 7 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328602 
144,773.25 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328644 
162,154.96 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4178529582 
23.524.24 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4496807488 
30.327.25 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4801908138 
2,855.29 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4911433407 
23,827.46 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098327406 
294,206.33 Sweep Transfer From Investment 
47,563.17 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
709.54 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328602 
206,809.27 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328644 
18,696.07 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4178529582 
149,761.68 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4496807488 
5,868.88 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4801908138 
208,783.60 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4911433407 
68,194.53 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098327406 
25,000.00 Transfer From DDA # 
000007483661471 
76,596.34 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
5,271.16 ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328602 
Continued on next page 
WFB2 017086 
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES 
CONCENTRATION ACOT 
Electronic Deposits/ Haul ^nciits 
Page 3 of 8 
Account No: 
Statement End D a t e . 
409 -8328487 
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ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4801908138 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4911433407 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098327406 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328602 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4496807488 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4801908138 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4911433407 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098327406 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4496807488 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4801908138 
ZBA Funding Account Transfei 
From 4911433407 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
ZBA Funding Account Jransf er 
From 4098328602 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4801908138 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098327406 
WT Fed#00126 Zions First 
Nation /Org=great Basin Gmc ' 
Trucks Inc Srf# 
20001215095436Cp 
Trn#001215022310 Rfb# 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
SBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328602 
ZBA Funding Account Tx*ansfer 
From 4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4178529582 
Continued on next page 
WFB2 017087 
i/I 
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES 
CONCENTRATION ACCT 
Electronic Deposits/ Bank Credits 
Page 4 of 8 
Account No: 





































































ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4801908138 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4911433407 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098327406 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328602 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328644 
* ZBA Funding Account-Transfer 
From 4801908138 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4911433407 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098327406 
Sweep Transfer From investment 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328602 
ZBA 'Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4496807488-. 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098327406 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4801908138 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4911433407 
* Z3A Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098327406 
Z3A Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328602 
Z3A Funding Account Transfer" 
From 4911433407 
Z3A Funding Account Transfer 
From 40983274X36 
Sweep Transfer From Investment 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4496807488 
Sweep Transfer From Investment 
ZBA Funding Account transfer 
From 4098328529 
Sweep Transfer From Investment 
W7 Fed#00435 Great Basin 
Trucks /Org=:great Basin Trucks 
Srf# 200012270828 
• Trn#00l227026891 Rfb# 
200012270828 
Continued on next page 
WFB2 017088 
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES 
CONCENTRATION ACCT 
E l e c t r o n i c Depos i t s / Banl<. i",t edit:,. 
Page 5 of 8 
Account No: 
























ZBA 'Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328529 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4801908138 
ZBA. Funding Account Transfer 
From 4098328644 
WT Fed#00654 Great Basin 
Trucks /Org=great Basin Trucks 
Srf# 20 ' . 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
From 4801908138 
Total Electronic Depo; •< „, 
Bank Credits 
14,275,861 .i:* 4 To t a 1 (.' r edit s 
Debits 
Electronic Debits/ Bank Debits 
Effective Posted 























221 , =570.07 
76i> . 206.L4 






1 9 r. 
8,577 .89 
10, 517., 72 
Transaction Detail 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
ZBA Funding Recount Transfer 
To 4759611866 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611-866 
Sweep Transfer To Investment 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4098328602 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
Sweep Transfer To Investment 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
WT Fed#01704 .Zions First 
Nation /Ftr/3nf=great 3asin 
Trucks Srf# PC00121210025233 
Trn#001212018679 Rfb= 
003471001 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
WT Fed#05185 Zions First 
Nation /Ftr/3nf«great 3asin 
Trucks Srf# MS1213 
Trn#001213037381* Rfb# 
003481001 
'ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4098328602 
ZBA Funding Account: Transfer 
To 4178529582 
Continued on next page 
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CONCENTRATION ACCT 
Electronic Debits/ Bank Debics 
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Dec 22 845.94 
Transaction Detail 
ZBA Funding'Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4098327406 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4496807488 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
Sweep Transfer.To Investment 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
Sweep Transfer To# Investment 
ZBA funding Account Transfer 
To 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4496807488 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To*4801908138 
Sweep Transfer To Investment 
Client Analysis Srvc Chrg • 
001219 Svc Chge 1100 
000004098328487 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4098328560 • 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4098328602 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
• To 4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4098328685 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4496807488 . 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4496807496 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
Sweep Transfer To Investment 
WT Fed#01596 First Security 
Ban /Ftr/Bnf =great Basin 
Trucks Srf# PC00122109164706 
Trn#001221018216 Rfb# 
003561001 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4801908138 
WT Fed#04251 First Security. 
Ban /Ftr/Bnf=great Basin 
Trucks Srf# PC00122211554859 
Trn#001222040221 Rfb# 
003571001 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4098328602 
Continued on next page 
WFB2 017090 
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES • 
CONCENTRATION ACCT 
Electronic Debits/ Bank: Debits 
Page 7 of 8 
Account N o : 4 09-8 3 2 84 3 
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,"'12.60 
7*2 .16 
: "U ! 
9 : if 
f I'. 2 J b 
r286.95 
*-* - r p n 
, .«.'••. 1 9 
, 2<Jb.77 
J T .. "£ V 
333.0b 
.931.49 
, ^f 4 r; 
Transaction Detail 
ZBA Funding Account transfer 
To 4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4801908138 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4911433407 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer' 
To 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4801908138 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4098327406 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4098328602 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To'4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 . 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4098327406 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 480190.8138 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4098328644 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4178529582 
ZBA Funding Account Transfer 
To 4759611866 
Total Eiectroni c Debits/ Bank 
Debits 
^ 7.53 Total Debits 
Daily Ledger Balance Summary 
Date - Balance 



























































289f 233, 00 
Continued on next page 
WFB2 017091 
Page 8 of 8 
Account No: 409-8328487 
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES 
CONCENTRATION ACCT Statement End Date: . 12/31/00 
Daily Ledger Balance Summary 
Date Balance Date Balance 
Dec 22 176,070,00 Dec 28 -828,951.36' 
Dec 26- ' -281,056.01 Dec 29 -53,310.05 
Dec 21 -790,160.73 
Average Daily Ledger Balance 402,428.39 




UT ST § 70A-9-201 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9-201 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LODE 
CHAPTER (-» SECURED TRANSACTIONS — SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND 
CHATTEL PAPER [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001] 
PAJv I VALIDITY OF SECURITY AGREEMENT AND RIGHTS OF PARTIES THERETO 
[REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, ^001] 
Copyright © 19b3-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
70A-9-201 General validity of security agreement |ht.pealed effective Jul 1, 
20011. 
Except as otherwise provided by this act a security agreement is effective 
according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral 
and against creditors. Nothing in this chapter validates any charge or practice 
illegal under any statute or regulation thereunder governing usury, small loans, 
retail installment sales, or the like, or extends the application of any such 
statute or regulation to any transaction not otherwise subject thereto. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-201. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repealed effective July 1, 2001.—Laws 2000, ch. 252, § 176 repeaLs this chapter 
effective July 1, 2001. 
Cross-References. —Variation by agreement, § 70A-1-102(3). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am.Jur.2d. —68A Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § § 160 et seq., 192 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 7 9 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions § n 
A.L.H. —Liability for the statutory penalty of persons other than the offending 
lender in a usurious loan transaction, 4 A.L.R.3d 650. 
What is "compound interest" within meaning of statutes prohibit in<\ fh< charging 
of such interest, 10 A.L.R.3d 421. 
Usury as affected by mistake in amount of calculation of interest or service 
charges for loan, 11 A.L.R.3d 1498. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9-201 
UT ST § 70A-9-201 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig, U.S. Govt. Works. 
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UT ST § 70A-9-203 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9-203 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 9. SECURED TRANSACTIONS — SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND 
CHATTEL PAPER [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001] 
PART 2. VALIDITY OF SECURITY AGREEMENT AND RIGHTS OF PARTIES THERETO 
[REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001] 
Copyright © 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
70A-9-203 Attachment and enforceability of security interest —Proceeds — Formal 
requisites [Repealed effective July 1, 2001]. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 70A-4-208 on the security interest of a 
collecting bank, Sections 70A-9-115 and 70A-9-116 on security interest in 
investment property, and Section 70A-9-113 on a security interest arising under the 
chapter on sales, a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or 
third parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless: 
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to 
agreement, the collateral is investment property and the secured party has control 
pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains 
a description of the collateral and in addition, when the security interest covers 
crops growing or to be grown or timber to be cut, a description of the land 
concerned; 
(b) value has been given; and 
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral. 
(2) A security interest attaches when it becomes enforceable against the debtor 
tfith respect to the collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all of the events 
specified in Subsection (1) have taken place unless explicit agreement postpones 
:he time of attaching. 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed, a security agreement gives the secured party the 
rights to proceeds provided by Section 70A-9-306. 
(4) A transaction, although subject to this chapter, is also subject to the Utah 
Iniform Consumer Credit Code, and in the case of conflict between the provisions of 
.his chapter and the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the provisions of the 
atter statute control. Failure to comply with any applicable statute has only the 
iffect which is specified therein. 
istory: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-203; 1969, ch. 18, § 9.103 (2) (b); 1977, ch. 272, 
14; 1989, ch. 218, § 48; 1996, ch. 204, § 64. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repealed effective July 1, 2001.—Laws 2000, ch. 252, § 176 repeals this section 
ffective July 1, 2001. 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
UT ST § 70A-9-203 Page 2 
U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9-203 
Amendment Notes. --The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection 
(1) substituted "Sections 70A-9-115 and 70A-9-116" for "Section 70A-8-321" and 
"investment property" for "securities," and in Subsection (1)(a) inserted "the 
collateral is investment property and the secured party has control pursuant to 
agreement." 
Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code.--The Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 
referred to in Subsection (4), is former Title 70B, which was repealed by Laws 
1985, ch. 159, § 9. Present similar provisions appear as Title 70C, the Utah 
Consumer Credit Code. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am.Jur.2d. —68A Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transac1 i 
C.J.S. —79 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions § J<i 
A.L.R. —Sufficiency of description of crops under UCC § § 9-203(b) and 9-
402(1), 67 A.L.R.3d 308. 
Conveyance of land as including mature but unharvested crops, 51 A.L.R.4th 1263, 
U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9-203 
UT ST § 70A-9-203 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9-205 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 9. SECURED TRANSACTIONS —- SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND 
CHATTEL PAPER [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001] 
PART 2. VALIDITY OF SECURITY AGREEMENT AND RIGHTS OF PARTIES THERETO 
[REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001] 
Copyright © 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
70A-9-205 Use or disposition of collateral without accounting permissible 
[Repealed effective July 1, 2001]. 
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of 
liberty in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral 
(including returned or repossessed goods) or to collect or compromise accounts or 
chattel paper, or to accept the return of goods or make repossessions, or to use, 
commingle or dispose of proceeds, or by reason of the failure of the secured party 
to require the debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral. This section 
does not relax the requirements of possession where perfection of a security 
interest depends upon possession of the collateral by the secured party or by a 
bailee. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-205; 1977, ch. 272, § 16. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repealed effective July 1, 2001.--Laws 2000, ch. 252, § 176 repeals this section 
effective July 1, 2001. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am.Jur.2d. —68A Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § 210. 
C.J.S. —79 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions § 89. 
J.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9-205 
JT ST § 70A-9-205 
1ND OF DOCUMENT 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9-302 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 9, SECURED TRANSACTIONS « SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND 
CHATTEL PAPER [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001] 
PART 3. RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES — PERFECTED AND UNPERFECTED SECURITY 
INTERESTS « RULES OF PRIORITY [REPEALED EFFECTIVE .JULY 3 , 2001] 
Copyright © 1 953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies, A]] rights reserved. 
70A-9-302 When filing is required to perfect security interest --Security 
interests to which filing provisions of this chapter do not apply [Repealed 
effective July 1, 2001], 
(1) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except 
the following: 
(a) a security interest in collateral in possession of the secured party under 
Section 70A-9-305; 
(b) a security interest temporarily perfected in instruments, certificated 
securities, or documents without delivery under Section 70A-9-304 or in proceeds 
for a ten-day period under Section 70A-9-306; 
(c) a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a 
trust or a decedent's estate; 
(d) a purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but filing is 
required for a motor vehicle required to be registered; and fixture filing is 
required for priority over conflicting interests in fixtures to the extent provided 
in Section 70A-9-313; 
(e) an assignment of accounts which does not alone or in conjunction with other 
assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the outstanding 
accounts of the assignor; 
(f) a security interest of a collecting bank as provided in Section 70A-4-208, 
or arising under the chapter on sales as provided in Section 70A-9-113, or covered 
in Subsection (3) of this section; 
(g) an assignment for the benefit of all the creditors of the transferor, and 
subsequent transfers by the assignee thereunder. 
(2) If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest, no filing under 
this chapter is required in order to continue the perfected status of the security 
interest against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor. 
(3) The filing of a financing statement otherwise required by this chapter is not 
necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to: 
(a) a statute or treaty of the United States which provides for a national or 
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international registration or a national or international certificate of title or 
which specifies a place of filing different from that specified in this chapter for 
filing of the security interest; 
(b) those statutes of this state which provide for the indication of security 
interests on certificates of title as a condition of the perfection of such 
security interests, but during any period in which collateral is inventory held for 
sale by a person who is in the business of selling goods of that kind, the filing 
provisions of this chapter, Part 4, apply to a security interest in that collateral 
created by him as debtor; or 
(c) a certificate of title statute of another jurisdiction under the law of 
which indication of a security interest on the certificate is required as a 
condition of perfection by Subsection 70A-9-103(2). 
(4) Compliance with a statute or treaty described in Subsection (3) is equivalent 
to the filing of a financing statement under this chapter, and a security interest 
in property subject to the statute or treaty can be perfected only by compliance 
therewith except as provided in Section 70A-9-103 on multiple state transactions. 
Duration and renewal of perfection of a security interest perfected by compliance 
with the statute or treaty are governed by the provisions of the statute or treaty; 
in other respects the security interest is subject to this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-302; 1977, ch. 272, § 18; 1989, ch. 218, § 49; 
1996, ch. 204, § 66. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repealed effective July 1, 2001.--Laws 2000, ch. 252, § 176 repeals this section 
effective July 1, 2001. 
Amendment Notes. — T h e 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection 
(1)(b) added "certficated securities"; in Subsection (1)(f) deleted "in securities 
as provided in Section 70A-8-321"; and made a stylistic change. 
Cross-References. --County recorder's fees, § 21-2-3. 
Index of chattel mortgages, county recorder to keep, § 17-21-6. 
Required filings, § 70A-11-106. 
Security interests in inventory, vehicles held for sale, § 41-la-601. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. —Comment, In re Littlejohn: Equitable Departure from State 
:ertificate of Title Act Filing Requirements, 1975 Utah L, Rev. 726. 
Washington Law Review.—Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-301(1) and Accounts, 
:ontract Rights, and Chattel Paper: The Non-existent Priorities, 41 Wash. L. Rev. 
195. 
Am.Jur.2d. — 6 8 A Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § § 288, 289, 293. 
C.J.S. — 7 9 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions § § 52 to 58. 
A.L.R. — W h a t constitutes "security interest" as to which financing statement 
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must be filed under Uniform Commercial Code § 9-302, 11 A.L.R.3d 1231. 
Determination of purchase price of farm equipment for purposes of UCC § 9 
302(1) (c) excusing filing of financing statement, 85 A,L.R.3d 1037. 
When is filing financing statement necessary to perfect an assignment ol accounts 
under UCC § 9-302(1)(e), 85 A.L.R.3d 1050. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9-302 
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END OF DOCUMENT 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 9. SECURED TRANSACTIONS -- SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND 
CHATTEL PAPER [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001] 
PART 3. RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES — PERFECTED AND UNPERFECTED SECURITY 
INTERESTS -- RULES OF PRIORITY [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001] 
Copyright © 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
70A-9-304 Perfection of security interest in instruments, documents, proceeds of a 
written letter of credit, and goods covered by documents -- Perfection by 
permissive filing —Temporary perfection without filing or transfer of possession 
[Repealed effective July 1, 2001]. 
(1) A security interest in chattel paper or negotiable documents may be perfected 
by filing. A security interest in the rights to proceeds of a written letter of 
credit can be perfected only by the secured party's taking possession of the letter 
of credit. A security interest in money or instruments, other than instruments 
which constitute part of chattel paper, can be perfected only by the secured 
party's taking possession, except as provided in Subsections (4) and (5) of this 
section and Subsections (2) and (3) of Section 70A-9-306 on proceeds. 
(2) During the period that goods are in the possession of the issuer of a 
negotiable document therefor, a security interest in the goods is perfected by 
perfecting a security interest in the document, and any security interest in the 
goods otherwise perfected during such period is subject thereto. 
(3) A security interest in goods in the possession of a bailee other than one who 
has issued a negotiable document therefor is perfected by issuance of a document in 
the name of the secured party or by the bailee's receipt of notification of the 
secured party's interest or by filing as to the goods. 
(4) A security interest in instruments, certificated securities, or negotiable 
documents is perfected without filing or the taking of possession for a period of 
21 days from the time it attaches to the extent that it arises for new value given 
mder a written security agreement. 
(5) A security interest remains perfected for a period of 21 days without filing 
/here a secured party having a perfected security interest in an instrument, a 
:ertificated security, a negotiable document, or goods in possession of a bailee 
>ther than one who has issued a negotiable document therefor: 
(a) makes available to the debtor the goods or documents representing the goods 
ror the purpose of ultimate sale or exchange or for the purpose of loading, 
mloading, storing, shipping, transshipping, manufacturing, processing, or 
•therwise dealing with them in a manner preliminary to their sale or exchange, but 
priority between conflicting security interests in the goods is subject to Section 
OA-9-312; or 
(b) delivers the instrument or certificated security to the debtor for the 
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purpose of ultimate sale or exchange or of presentation, collection, renewal, or 
registration of transfer. 
(6) After the 21-day period in Subsections (4) and (5), perfection depends upon 
compliance with applicable provisions of this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-304; 1977, • ±?; ±.?OJ, ^i. 218, § 50; 
1996, ch. 204, § 68; 1997, ch. 241, § 26. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repealed effective July 1, 2001.--Laws 2000, ch. 252, ;'- ] h r^ p^ al.s this section 
effective July 1, 2001. 
Amendment Notes. —The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection 
(1) deleted "certificated securities or" before the second occurrence of 
"instruments"; in Subsections (4) and (5) deleted "other than" before "certificated 
securities"; added "or certificated security" in Subsection (5)(b); and made a 
stylistic change. 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, added the second sentence in 
Subsection (1), relating to perfecting security interest in rights to proceeds of a 
written letter of credit. 
Cross-References. --Warehouse receipts, bills of lading and other documents of 
title, § § 70A-7-101 to 70A-7-603. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am.Jur.2d. —68A Am. .lui 2d Secured Transactions § § 476, 479. 
C.J.S. — 7 9 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions § ». 
U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9-304 
UT ST § 7 0A-9-304 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 9. SECURED TRANSACTIONS — SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND 
CHATTEL PAPER [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001] 
PART 3. RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES -- PERFECTED AND UNPERFECTED SECURITY 
INTERESTS -- RULES OF PRIORITY [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001] 
Copyright © 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
70A-9-306 "Proceeds" —Secured party's rights on disposition of collateral or 
debtor's insolvency [Repealed effective July 1, 2001]. 
(1) "Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, lease, exchange, 
collection, or other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by 
reason of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that 
it is payable to a person other than a party to the security agreement. Any 
payments or distributions made with respect to investment property collateral are 
proceeds. Money, checks, deposit accounts, and the like are "cash proceeds." All 
other proceeds are "noncash proceeds." 
(2) Except where this chapter or Chapter 2a, Leases, otherwise provides, a 
security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange, or other 
disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in 
the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable 
proceeds including collections received by the debtor. 
(3) The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security 
interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to 
be a perfected security interest and becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of 
the proceeds by the debtor unless: 
(a) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds 
are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the 
Dffice or offices where the financing statement has been filed and, if the proceeds 
are acquired with cash proceeds, the description of collateral in the financing 
statement indicates the types of property constituting the proceeds; 
(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds 
ire identifiable cash proceeds; 
(c) the original collateral was investment property and the proceeds are 
.dentifiable cash proceeds; or 
(d) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration of 
he ten-day period. Except as provided in this section, a security interest in 
»roceeds can be perfected only by the methods or under the circumstances permitted 
n this chapter for original collateral of the same type. 
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a 
ecured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected 
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security interest only in the following proceeds: 
(a) in identifiable noncash proceeds and in separate deposit accounts 
containing only proceeds; 
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is neither 
commingled with other money nor deposited in a deposit account prior to the 
insolvency proceedings; 
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the like which are 
not deposited in a deposit account prior to the insolvency proceedings; and 
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts of the debtor in which proceeds have been 
commingled with other funds, but the perfected security interest under this 
Subsection (d) is: 
(i) subject to any right of setoff; and 
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any cash proceeds 
received by the debtor within ten days before the institution of the insolvency 
proceedings less the sum of: 
(A) the payments to the secured party on account of cash proceeds received by 
the debtor during such period; and 
(B) the cash proceeds received by the debtor during such period to which the 
secured party is entitled under Subsections (a) through (c) of this Subsection (4). 
(5) If a sale or lease of goods results in an account or chattel paper which is 
transferred by the seller or lessor to a secured party, and if the goods are 
returned to or are repossessed by the seller, lessor, or the secured party, the 
following rules determine priorities: 
(a) If the goods were collateral at the time of sale or lease, for an 
indebtedness of the seller or lessor which is still unpaid, the original security 
interest attaches again to the goods covered by the sale or lease and continues as 
a perfected security interest if it was perfected at the time when the goods were 
sold or leased. If the security interest was originally perfected by a filing which 
is still effective, nothing further is required to continue the perfected status; 
in any other case, the secured party must take possession of the returned or 
repossessed goods or must file. 
(b) An unpaid transferee of the chattel paper has a security interest in the 
goods against the transferor. Such security interest is prior to a security 
interest asserted under Subsection (a) to the extent that the transferee of the 
chattel paper was entitled to priority under Section 70A-9-308. 
(c) An unpaid transferee of the account has a security interest in the goods 
against the transferor. Such security interest is subordinate to a security 
interest asserted under Subsection (a). 
(d) A security interest of an unpaid transferee asserted under Subsection (b) 
or (c) must be perfected for protection against creditors of the transferor and 
purchasers of the returned or repossessed goods. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 1 VI, § 9-306; 1977, ch. 272, § 21; 1990, ch. 197, § 84; 
1996, ch. 204, § 70. 
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NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repealed effective July 1, 2001.—Laws 2000, ch. 252, § 176 repeals this chapter 
effective July 1, 2001. 
Amendment Notes. —The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, added Subsection 
(3)(c), making related redesignation changes, and in Subsection (1) added the 
sentence beginning "Any payments..." and made a stylistic change. 
Cross-References. —Course of dealing and usage of trade, § 70A-1-205. 
Entrusting possession of goods to merchant, power to transfer rights of 
entruster, § 70A-2-403(2). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. —Bankruptcy Law, Secured Transactions, Bankruptcy 
Trustee's Power to Avoid as Preferential a Creditor's Perfected Security Interest 
Under U.C.C. Section 9-306(4) (d) in Excess Proceeds, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 938. 
Am.Jur.2d. —68A Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § § 85 to 100. 
C.J.S. --79 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions § § 117, 1.18. 
A.L.R. —Effectiveness of original financing statement under UCC Article 9 after 
change in debtor's name, identity, or business structure, 99 A.L.R.3d 1194. 
Construction and effect of UCC § 9-311 giving debtor right to transfer his 
interest in collateral, 45 A.L.R.4th 411. 
Secured transactions: government agricultural program payments as "proceeds" of 
agricultural products under UCC § 9-306, 79 A.L.R.4th 903. 
Equitable estoppel of secured party's right to assert prior, perfected security 
interest against other secured creditor or subsequent purchaser under Article 9 of 
Uniform Commercial Code, 9 A.L.R.5th 708. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9-306 
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INSLEY MFG. CORP. v, 
Cluat7l7P.2d 
[5] The possible interests of others in 
the vehicle have been adequately protected 
by the legislature and should not have been 
relied upon by the district court as a basis 
for denial of the petition. All persons hav-
ing claims in the property must be notified 
of the petition for forfeiture.1 Any person 
claiming an interest in the vehicle can file a 
petition for release of his interest in the 
property.2 If the claimant has a valid in-
terest that is not subject to forfeiture, the 
court shall order release of the property or 
partial release and forfeiture,3 in which 
case the property is sold and the proceeds 
distributed among legitimate claimants 
first4 
The district judge expressed concern that 
the persons penalized on forfeiture would 
be the bank that loaned Arave the purchase 
money for the car and Arave's father who 
stood as guarantor for the loan. The 
record does not show that either the bank 
or Arave's father filed a claim on the ve-
hicle. There is no assertion that they 
failed to receive notice or were prevented 
from entering evidence at the hearing. If 
the district court concluded that they had 
legitimate claims, the statute clearly pro-
vided a method for satisfaction of the 
claims upon forfeiture of the vehicle. 
[6] As to the final point that the value 
of the car was disproportionate to the use 
made of the vehicle in transporting contra-
band, we hold that the value of the proper-
ty seized is immaterial. The statute is 
devoid of any intent to the contrary. To 
hold that property would not be subject to 
forfeiture due to its value would seem to 
be contrary to the intent and purpose of 
the statute. The law was not meant to 
reward the drug dealer who is "prosperous 
in his traffic" by refusing to forfeit his 
expensive car.5 The statute manifests the 
opposite intent. 
We hold therefore that the trial court 
erred in denying the petition for forfeiture. 
1. U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37-13(9)(c). 
2. U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37-13(9)(e). 
3. U.C.A.f 1953, § 58-37-13(9)0). 
DRAPER BANK & TRUST Utah 1341 
1341 (Utah 1986) 
The order of denial is reversed, and the 
case is remanded with direction to grant 
the petition. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and ZIM-
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents. 





DRAPER BANK & TRUST, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 19317. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 24, 1986. 
Creditor brought action against bank 
for conversion of secured collateral. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ju-
dith A. Billings, J., entered judgment in 
favor of creditor, and bank appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., held that credi-
tor's perfected purchase money security in-
terest in cash proceeds of inventory sold by 
debtor had priority over bank's setoff 
rights after proceeds were deposited in 
debtor's account. 
Affirmed. 
Howe, J., concurred in result 
1. Secured Transactions <&=»168 
Creditor's perfected purchase money 
security interest in cash proceeds of inven-
4. U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37-13(9)0)0). 
5. State v. One Porsche, supra (Crockett J„ dis-
senting). 
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tory sold by debtor had priority over bank's 
setoff rights after proceeds were deposited 
in debtor's account, which previously had 
been overdrawn. U.C.A.1953, 70A-9-
104(i), 70A-9-306(S). 
2. Appeal and Error <s=*173(2) 
Bank could not raise issue of whether 
it was holder in due course of check depos-
ited in debtor's account for first time on 
appeal. 
Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
Kim R. Wilson, Henry C. Chai, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Insley Manufacturing Corp. ("Insley") 
sued Draper Bank & Trust ("Draper") for 
conversion of secured collateral. About a 
year later, both parties moved for summa-
ry judgment. The trial court ruled in favor 
of Insley. On appeal, Draper seeks rever-
sal of the lower court order and judgment 
entered in favor of its summary judgment 
motion or, alternatively, that the case be 
remanded for trial. We affirm. 
I. 
Insley sold to Schneider Machinery Sales 
("Schneider") an H 1500-C backhoe. Ins-
ley financed the transaction and received a 
security interest in the equipment and its 
proceeds on October 16, 1978. Insley then 
filed a financing statement with the Secre-
tary of State's office on November 20, 
1978. The statement covered: "All Insley 
Backhoes, Attachments, Accessories, and 
Parts sold to Debtor by Secured Party for 
resale or rental by the debtor, in which 
secured party has a security interest 
whether now owned or hereinafter ac-
1. At argument, counsel for Draper argued that a 
computer printout constituting Schneider's Oc-
tober 1979 bank statement failed to reflect an 
overdraft. However, the deposition of Draper's 
president and director, Dewey Bluth, explains 
that the transaction is not reflected because of 
Draper's procedure in handling returnable items 
and in posting transactions on its computer; in 
short, the printout fails to reflect the actual 
quired, including proceeds from such sale 
or rental payments received under the rent-
al of such equipment" The H 1500-C was 
shipped by Insley on March 1, 1979, 
In March of 1979, Draper established 
business checking account No. 81-02047-1 
for Schneider. Sometime prior to October 
5,1979, five checks totalling $91,621.25 and 
drawn against the account were presented 
to Draper for payment On October 5, 
Draper determined that the account con-
tained insufficient funds to cover the 
checks and decided to pay them in over-
draft Accordingly, on that date, Draper 
notified Schneider in a debit memo that the 
bank intended to cover the checks and 
charge the account a $15 service charge 
and 18% interest for use of the funds. 
According to Schneider's bank statement, 
however, this transaction was posted on 
October 9, 1979.1 
On October 9, 1979, Schneider completed 
the sale of the H 150O-C backhoe and an H 
1000 backhoe to L.J. O'Brien for $237,-
918.30. The proceeds from the sale were 
given to Schneider in the form of a check 
from O'Brien's financing company, ITT In-
dustrial Credit Company ("ITT"). The 
same day, Schneider deposited the check 
along with others into the Draper account. 
The total deposit was $238,491.53. Draper, 
in turn, credited Schneider's account for 
the deposit and then paid itself from the 
account for the money loaned to pay the 
checks. Schneider then paid Insley $79,-
212.80 for the H 1000 backhoe, but could 
not pay for the H 1500-C because of Drap-
er's debit of the account A deposition 
relied on by plaintiff in its summary judg-
ment motion indicates that Schneider owed 
approximately $130,000 to Insley for the H 
1500-C. 
timing of events at the bank. Bluth, who ap-
proved all of Draper's items paid in overdraft, 
admitted the overdraft existed. Also, the 
charges listed in the overdraft debit memo cor-
respond to those on Schneider's bank statement 
In view of the facts submitted below taken in 
light of the midnight deadline imposed by 
U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-4-301(l), the claim of no 
overdraft is spurious. 
INSLEY MFG. CORP. v 
Cite a« 717 PJtd 
Schneider filed for voluntary bankruptcy 
on August 6, 1980. Insley filed this action 
on March 25, 1982. On April 7, 1983, Ins-
ley moved for summary judgment. On 
April 21, 1983, Draper also moved for sum-
mary judgment based on "undisputed facts 
that are presented by the Motion, Affida-
vits, deposition of President Dewey C. 
Bluth, Draper Bank & Trust Company, and 
the Memorandum submitted by plaintiff 
and defendant" Insley's motion was 
granted on April 26, 1983. The following 
day, defendant filed its objections, claiming 
material issues of fact remained. Specifi-
cally, Draper contended that there was no 
evidence presented that the debtor 
(Schneider) had not paid the balance owing 
on the H 1500-C. Draper also moved the 
court for permission to file the voluntary 
bankruptcy petition and schedules attached 
thereto as exhibits. Draper's motion to file 
the exhibits was denied on May 18, 1983. 
Further, on May 31, 1983, Insley filed a 
supplemental affidavit which stated that 
the indebtedness secured by the H 1500-C 
backhoe had exceeded $91,621.25 since Oc-
tober 9, 1979, and remained unpaid on the 
17th of May, 1983. Accordingly, on June 6, 
2. See U.CA., 1953, §§ 70A-9-203UM2), 
-107(a), -302(1), -303(1), -401(1), -402(1), (3), 
(10). The Insley/Schneider transaction was a 
multistate transaction. For purposes of this 
opinion, we presume sections 70A-9-103(l)(a) 
and (b) are controlling. U.CA., 1953, § 70A-9-
109(4) provides that goods held by a person for 
sale or lease are classified as inventory. See 
also U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-9-105(l)(h). 
3. See U.CA., 1953, §§ 70A-9-205, -307(1). Ins-
ley's security agreement expressly provided that 
Schneider could sell the inventory in the ordi-
nary course of business. 
4. See U.CA., 1953, §§ 70A-9-306(l)-(2), 
^•203(3). The bank was not a buyer in the 
ordinary course of business. See U.CA, 1953, 
§ 70A-1-201(9). 
5. See U.C.A., 1953, §§ 70A-9-105(e), -306(1)-
(2). The case law authority is almost unani-
mous that commingling of cash proceeds with 
other funds does not necessarily make the pro-
ceeds unidentifiable. EG., CO. Funk <fr Sons, 
Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 89 III. 2d 27, 31, 59 
III. Sec. 85, 87, 431 N.E.2d 370, 372 (1982) (argu-
ment that security interest in proceeds termi-
nates when deposited in bank account because 
DRAPER BANK & TRUST Utah 1343 
1341 (Utah 1986) 
1983, the trial judge entered judgment in 
Insley's favor. 
II. 
[1] Insley entered into the H 1500-C 
security agreement with Schneider to se-
cure the purchase price of the backhoe. 
Insley then filed a UCC-1 with the proper 
filing officer. Thus, after Insley delivered 
the H 1500-C to Schneider, Insley had a 
perfected purchase money security interest 
in the inventory.2 When Schneider sold the 
H 1500-C backhoe, Insley lost its security 
interest in that inventory,3 but its interest 
remained in the identifiable cash proceeds 
(the portion of the ITT check attributable 
to the H 1500-C sale price).4 When 
Schneider deposited the ITT check on Octo-
ber 9, its account was credited with the 
entire amount The account, a "deposit 
account," then contained, in part, identifia-
ble cash proceeds from the H 1500-C sale.6 
Draper contends that Insley's security in-
terest became unperfected because Draper 
is not constrained by section 9-306(3).6 
Such a broad assertion is untenable, how-
ever, particularly in light of the 1977 
amendment to Hie Utah Code excepting 
proceeds from its exclusion provisions.7 
identification is impossible has found little fa-
vor in the courts); Michigan Natl Bank v. Flow-
ers Mobile Homes Sales, Inc., 26 N.CApp. 690, 
695, 217 S.E.2d 108, 111-12 (1975) (rule requir-
ing separate account for earmarked proceeds 
incompatible with underlying purpose of code); 
Anderson, Clayton <fc Co. v. First Am. Bank, 
Okla., 614 P.2d 1091, 1093-94 (1980). See also 
U.CA., 1953, § 70A-M02(2) (purpose of the 
UCC), § 70A-9-205 (concerning in part the free-
dom of a debtor to commingle proceeds), 
§ 70A-1-103 (code is to be supplemented by 
"principles of law and equity"). 
6. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are 
to the Uniform Commercial Code contained in 
U.CA. tit. 70A. 
7. The Code now provides that article nine does 
not apply "to a transfer of interest in any depos-
it account, . . . except as provided with respect to 
proceeds (section 70A-£-306) and priorities in 
proceeds (section 70A-9-312)." U.CA,, 1953, 
§ 70A-9-104(/). Prior to the 1977 amendment 
the substance of § 70A-9-104(/) was contained at 
U.CA., 1953, § 70A-9-!04(k). That provision 
provided that article 9 did not apply "to a trans-
fer in whole or in part of any of the following: 
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Although Draper claimed at argument that 
Insley's cited authority was inapposite, we 
find that Insley's authority squarely ad-
dresses the dispositive issue in this case:8 
whether section 9-104(i), stating that arti-
cle nine does not apply "to any right of 
setoff," has any applicability to the priority 
provisions of article nine. 
A small minority of jurisdictions and 
some commentators have construed 9-
104(i) broadly, taking the position that the 
provision excludes all situations concerning 
setoffs, not only from the Code's security 
and filing provisions, but also from the 
Code's priority provisions.9 The principal 
reasoning underlying these decisions is as 
follows: First, the official comment to the 
Uniform Commercial Code can be read as 
favoring this view. For example, the offi-
cial comment to 9-101 provides "[t]his Arti-
cle sets out a comprehensive scheme for 
the regulation of security interests in per-
sonal property and fixtures." Since setoffs 
are excluded from the Code's definition of 
security interests, it is possible to conclude 
"interests in property other than security 
any claim arising out of tort; any deposit, sav-
ings, passbook or like account maintained with 
a bank, savings and loan association, credit un-
ion or like organization." See also Coogan, 
Kripke & Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9: 
Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in 
Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, 
and Participation Agreements, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 
229, 263 (1965), cited with approval in Commer-
cial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee W. Bank, 61 
Wis. 2d 671, 684 n. 18, 214 N.W.2d 33, 39 n. 18 
(1974). 
8. Specifically, Insley cites Citizens Natl Bank v. 
Mid-States Dev. Co., 177 Ind.App. 548, 380 
N.E.2d 1243 (1978). Citizens National squarely 
deals with offsets against cash proceeds held by 
banks in deposit accounts. United States v. 
Handy <fr Harman, 750 F.2d 777, 787 (9th Cir, 
1984). 
9. E.g., State Bank v. First Bank, Minn., 320 
N.W.2d 723, 725 (1982); First Natl Bank v. Lone 
Star Life Ins. Co., Tex.( 529 S.W.2d 67, 68 (1975) 
(per curiam); Skilton, The Secured Party's 
Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account Under Article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1977 S.I1L 
U.LJ. 120, 201-05. 
10. See National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Virgin-
ia Capital Bank, 498 F.Supp. 1078, 1085 (E.D.Va. 
1980), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 673 F.2d 
interests are beyond the scope of all por-
tions of Article 9." l° Second, other 9-104 
exclusions, such as the "landlord's lien," 
have been construed as controlling over the 
Code's priority provisions.11 Third, com-
mentators claim the Code can be read as 
indicating its drafters intended 9-104(i) to 
be absolute.12 Fourth, the language in 
Professor Gilmore's commentary (quoted 
infra) has been extended beyond its mean-
ing.13 
A majority of jurisdictions have con-
strued section 9-104(i) narrowly to mean 
that a right of setoff may exist in a credi-
tor who fails to comply with the security 
agreement and filing provisions of article 
nine, but that the section 9-104(i) exclusion 
does not extend to the Code's priority pro-
visions.14 The reasoning underlying the 
majority view is significantly more per-
suasive than that underlying the broad in-
terpretation followed by the minority of 
courts. 
In regard to section 9-104(i), Professor 
Gilmore, a principal reporter for article 
nine, explained: 
1314 (4th Cir. 1981). See also National Accept-
ance Co. of Am. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 491 
RSupp. 1269, 1273 (E.D.Va.1980). 
11. 1 P.Coogan, W. Hogan, D. Vagts & J. McDon-
nell, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code § 5A.15[2] (1985). 
12. See generally Note, Conflicts Between a 
Bank's Common Law Right of Setoff and a Se-
cured Party's Interest in Identifiable Proceeds, 9 
Loy.U.Chi.LJ. 454, 462-65 (1978). 
13. IP. Coogan, W. Hogan, D. Vagts & J. McDon-
nell, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code § 5A15[2] (1985). 
14. Eg., Continental Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 
251 Ga. 412, 414, 306 S.E.2d 285, 287 (1983); 
Farns Assocs. v. South Side Bank, 93 Ill.App.3d 
766, 771-72, 49 Ill.Dec. 128, 132-34, 417 N.E.2d 
818, 822-24 (1981); Citizens Natl Bank v. Mid-
States Dev. Co., 177 Ind.App. 548, 556, 380 
N.E.2d 1243, 1248 (1978); Coachmen Indus., 
Inc. v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, Iowa, 329 
N.W.2d 648, 650 (1983); Morris Plan Co. v. 
Broadway Natl Bank, Mo.App„ 598 S.W.2d 557, 
560 (1980); Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity 
Union Trust Co., 11II NJ^upcr. 353, 357-58, 268 
A.2d 330, 332 (1970); First Wisconsin Natl Bank 
v. Midland Natl Bank, 76 Wis.2d 662, 670, 251 
N.W.2d 829, 833 (1977). 
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Cite as 717 P^d 
This exclusion is an apt example of the 
absurdities which result when draftsmen 
attempt to appease critics by putting into 
a statute something that is not in any 
sense wicked but is hopelessly irrelevant 
Of course a right of set-off is not a 
security interest and has never been con-
fused with one: the statute might as 
appropriately exclude fan dancing. A 
bank's right of set-off against a deposi-
tor's account is often loosely referred to 
as a "banker's lien," but the "lien" usage 
has never led anyone to think that the 
bank held a security interest in the bank 
account. Banking groups were, how-
ever, concerned lest someone, someday, 
might think that a bank's right of set-off, 
because it was called a lien, was a securi-
ty interest. Hence the exclusion, which 
does no harm except to the dignity and 
self-respect of the draftsmen.15 
This language indicates that banks need 
not comply with article nine to create a 
right of setoff, but given the narrow pur-
pose of the exclusion it is unsound to read 
it as removing transactions in the commer-
cial arena from the Code when the priority 
of a setoff is involved.16 Additional sup-
port for the majority rule can be found by 
examining other exclusion sections in 9-
104. For example, 9-104{c), the exclusion 
for mechanic's liens and liens for services, 
and 9-104(h), the exclusion for the judg-
ment lienor, have their priority in terms of 
secured property clearly spelled out in the 
Code's various priority provisions.17 Argu-
ably, had drafters of the Code intended 
9-104(i) to exclude setoffs from the priority 
provisions, they would have expressly so 
provided as they did with other exclusion 
sections. This rationale may be extended 
further by examination of 9-201, which 
provides that security agreements are ef-
fective according to their terms between 
15. G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal 
Property 315-16 (1965). 
16. Eg., Citizens Natl Bank, 177 Ind.App. at 555, 
380 N.E.2d at 1248. 
17. See, e.g., U.C.A., 1953. §§ 70A-9-310, 
-301<l)(b). 
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the parties, and against third-party credi-
tors, except as otherwise provided by the 
Code. There is no express provision in the 
Code suggesting a perfected security inter-
est is subordinate to a right of setoff. 
Further support for a narrow interpreta-
tion of 9-104(i) is gleaned from examination 
of 9-306(4)(d), which provides: 
In the event of insolvency proceedings 
instituted by or against a debtor, a se-
cured party with a perfected security 
interest in proceeds has a perfected se-
curity interest only in the following pro-
ceeds: 
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts of 
the debtor in which proceeds have been 
commingled with other funds, but the 
perfected security interest under this 
paragraph (d) is 
(i) subject to any right of setoff.... 
The contention is that "this provision would 
be unnecessary if the relative priority of 
any right of set-off was unaffected by Arti-
cle 9 because all perfected security inter-
ests, and not merely those recognized un-
der section 9-306(4Xd), would be equally 
'subject to any right of setoff/ "1 8 
Moreover, section 1-102l* mandates that 
the Code is to be liberally construed to 
promote its underlying purposes and poli-
cies, including the clarification of the law 
governing commercial transactions. The 
purpose and concept of notice filing would 
be significantly weakened if we held that 
Draper is not bound by that which it would 
have discovered through a proper inquiry.20 
Finally, section 9-205 provides in part 
14A security interest is not invalid or fraud-
ulent against creditors by reason of liberty 
in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose 
of all or part of the collateral . . . or to use, 
commingle or dispose of proceeds " 
19. Principles of construction found in chapter 
one are integrated into article nine by section 
70A-9-105(4). 
20. See Fartts Assocs., 93 IH.App.3d at 772, 49 
IlLDec. at 133, 417 N.E.2d at 823. 
18. National Acceptance Co., 498 RSupp. at 1084. 
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The purpose of the provision is to relieve 
creditors from the age-old requirement of 
policing collateral in the hands of a debtor. 
Adoption of the minority approach places 
such a duty on creditors and * 'would se-
verely undercut significant values of cer-
tainty, efficiency and reliance which are at 
the heart of the Codal emphasis on public 
filing/'21 A secured party should be able 
to rely on his compliance with the Code's 
requirements for perfection and his search 
of the record as against an unrecorded 
interest of a setting-off bank.22 
In its brief, Draper contends that pro-
ceeds in the form of checks which are 
deposited in checking accounts should not 
be held in abeyance for ten days. Drap-
er implies that such a result is necessary if 
this Court rules in favor of Insley. Draft-
ers of the Code were also concerned with 
this problem. Section 4-208 provides that 
a collecting bank has a perfected security 
interest in a deposited item as a matter of 
law when it credits a customer's account in 
reliance on the deposited item. The section 
also gives the collecting bank priority in 
the security interest.25 In this case, how-
ever, Draper, while standing in the shoes of 
a payee bank, determined on October 5, 
1979, that Schneider's account contained 
insufficient funds to cover the presented 
items. Draper could have most easily and 
least expensively avoided this dispute; 
Draper could merely have returned the 
items it covered for Schneider in over-
draft24 Instead, Draper advised Schneider 
on October 5 that it was extending nearly 
$100,000 to cover the checks. A debit 
memo in the record indicates that Draper 
notified Schneider that Draper was charg-
ing Schneider a $15 fee and 18% interest 
for this "service." This transaction was 
not secured since the bank was not lending 
against a deposited item. 
21. Id. 
22. Citizens Natl Bank, 177 Ind.App. at 559r 380 
N.E.2d at 1249. 
23. See also U.C.A., 1953, §§ 70A-9-203(l), 9-
302(l)(f), 9-312(1). 
24. U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-4-301. 
Draper contends that section 9-306(4) 
governs the priority dispute in this case 
since Schneider was not able to cover the 
checks as they were presented to the bank. 
Draper relies on Citizens & Southern Na-
tional Bank v. Weyerhaeuser Co,25 How-
ever, that case is easily distinguished. In 
Citizens & Southern, the bank exercised 
its right of setoff only after the debtor 
acknowledged in writing that it was in de-
fault, authorized the bank to take posses-
sion of its assets, and ceased operations. 
Here, the fact that Draper agreed to lend 
Schneider the funds to pay the checks on 
October 5 establishes that Schneider was 
solvent; a company is not insolvent merely 
because it has to pay its bills with bor-
rowed funds. The court in Citizens Na-
tional Bank M was unpersuaded by a sim-
ilar argument: 
This argument is without merit It is 
premised on a misconstruction of the lan-
guage and purpose of section 9-306<4Xd). 
The triggering phrase of that section is 
"In the event of insolvency proceedings 
instituted by or against a debtor " It 
is plain that the limiting provisions of 
subsections (4XdXi) and (ii) are to serve 
as tracing rules for the secured party 
asserting an interest in proceeds only 
when they are brought within the debt-
or's estate in an insolvency proceeding. 
Here the funds in question were not 
made a part of Huntington's estate in 
bankruptcy. For purposes of determin-
ing the validity and extent of Soya's pro-
ceeds security interest, the subsequent 
institution of bankruptcy proceedings in 
the present case is irrelevant Since the 
limitations contained in section 9-
306(4Xd) have no operation outside the 
area of insolvency proceedings the trial 
court properly disregarded them.27 
25. 152 Gaj\pp. 176, 262 S.E.2d 485 (1979). 
26. 177 Ind-App. at 548, 380 N.E.2d at 1243. 
27. Id. at 553, 380 N.E.2d at 1246 (citations omit-
ted). See also National Acceptance Co,, 498 
F.Supp. at 1084 n. 5 ("present proceedings, 
while occasioned by Structures' insolvency, are 
not insolvency proceedings, defined at section 
INSLEY MFG. CORP. v. 
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This is not an insolvency proceeding insti-
tuted by or against Schneider. Further, 
Schneider's bankruptcy in 1980 has no 
bearing on this case since the conversion 
occurred on October 9, 1979. 
Analysis of the facts of this case pursu-
ant to section 9-306(3) shows that Insley's 
purchase money security interest in the 
proceeds was perfected on October 9.2S As 
noted above, Draper was an unsecured 
creditor on October 9. Although no specif-
ic rule deals directly with the priority con-
flict between Insley's perfected security in-
terest and Draper's setoff rights, we be-
lieve that the Code's priority rules require 
that Insley's interest must prevail over 
Draper's right of setoff. The cornerstone 
of the Code's complex priority provisions, 
section 9-201, provides in pertinent part: 
"Except as otherwise provided by this act a 
security agreement is effective according 
to its terms between the parties, against 
purchasers of the collateral and against 
creditors." As stated in Continental 
American Life Insurance Co.:w "The ef-
fect of this section is to give the Article 
Nine secured party, upon a debtor's de-
fault, priority over 'anyone, anywhere, any-
how* except as otherwise provided by the 
remaining Code priority rules." Since 
there are no other rules in the Code to 
resolve the conflict, section 9-201 is con-
trolling. 
[2] Draper also contends that it was a 
holder in due course and thus took the 
instrument free of Insley's security inter-
est. However, the record does not reflect 
that Draper argued the holder-in-due-
course theory below. Its papers all reflect 
argument as to why it and not Insley was 
1-201(22) of the Code"); Michigan Natl Bank, 
26 N.CApp. at 695. 217 S.E.2d at 112. 
28. See U.C.A., 1953, §§ 70A-9-306(3)(b), (c), 
-302(l)(b). 
29. 251 Ga. at 414, 306 S.E.2d at 287 (citations 
omitted). 
30. Kg, Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., Utah, 692 
P.2d 754, 758 (1984). Even if Draper was a 
holder in due course, it would only take the ITT 
check free of Insley's security interest. The 
credit to Schneider's deposit account given in 
exchange for the check was proceeds under the 
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entitled to the deposit account. Draper 
may not raise this issue for the first time 
on appeal.30 
Draper's claim that disputed material 
facts should have prevented the granting 
of Insley's motion is not well taken. Spe-
cifically, Draper claims there is a question 
as to whether Schneider fully or partially 
paid the H 1500-C debt Contrary to 
claims in Draper's brief, Insley filed an 
affidavit in support of its motion for sum-
mary judgment which states the debt ex-
ceeded $91,621.25 as of January 24, 1983.31 
Only after the denial of Draper's motion 
did counsel attempt to introduce Schneid-
er's bankruptcy schedules, though the 
same were available prior to the lower 
court order. Even if the trial court had 
permitted the schedules into evidence, the 
fact they show Insley as having no security 
interest in an H 1500-C does not support 
Draper's claim of disputed material facts. 
The sale to O'Brien of the H 1500-C (the 
only H 1500-C Schneider ever received) cut 
off Insley's security interest in the H 1500-
C. Moreover, the schedules do show Ins-
ley with a security interest in proceeds of 
sale of $142,000. Finally, when Draper 
raised the issue in its objections, Insley 
filed another affidavit stating the balance 
was still owing. There are no disputed 
facts. 
The judgment is affirmed. Costs to Ins-
ley. 
STEWART, DURHAM and ZIMMER-
MAN, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the result. 
Code, and Insley's security interest would have 
remained in the deposit account until depleted 
in the ordinary course of Schneider's business. 
31. The affidavit provides in part: "5. In Octo-
ber 1979, Schneider Machinery Sales owed Ins-
ley Manufacturing in excess of $91,621.25 on 
the H 1500-C backhoe. 6. Demand has been 
made upon Schneider Machinery Sales for pay-
ment, but Schneider Machinery Sales has failed 
to pay the amount it owes to Insley." (Empha-
sis added.) 
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Total Beginning Balance 
Transfer from Sail Lake Volvo WFB Account: 
Trust Money 
Other 
Transfer from Arizona WFB Account. 
Trust Money 
Other 
Transfer from Southwest WFB Account 
Trust Money 
Olher 
Transfer Irom Idaho WFB Account: 
Trust Money 
Other 
Transier to Great Basin Trucks FSB Account 
Trust Money 
Other 
Transitu Irom Great Basin Trucks FSB Account 
Trust Money 
Oiher 
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Ending 
Balance 
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661.274 (261.056) (790.161) (B28,951)_S J53.310) 







616383 S 1.099 191 S 753,332 S 632 689 S 396.309 t 597.043 S 2,270.574 S 2.349.774 t 1391.200 $ 2.989 074 S 1.125001 S 661.274 S (281056) S
 (790 161) S, (82B.9SU S (53.310^ 
125.925 420.620 578.917 648.344 632.699 404.309 1.639.510 1,651.755 1691585 1691.585 
490.458 678.571 174.415 (15.655) (236.380) 192.734 631.063 698.019 299.615 1.297.489 
725.335 661.274 




Total Beginning Balance 
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES • FIRST SECURITY BANK (222-00085-32) 
S $ $ 1.066.584 S 1,066,584 $ 1.099.214 $ 1.099.214 5 2.982.181 
50,904 1.180 5B7 1,311271 1,011,571 1,130.786 32 203 
2.230.002 S 3,014.385 
Transfer From WFB Concentration Account 
Trust Money 
Other 
Transier |o WFB Concentration Account 
Associated Foods Truck Payment (Trust Money) 
Johnston Supply Truck Payment (Tnisl Money) 
Other Receipts and Disbursements 
Receipts 
Disbursements 
Ending Balance s s s s s 
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(Cite as: 90 N.W. 905) 
Supreme Court of Nebraska. 
CITY OF LINCOLN 
v. 
MORRISON ET AL. 
May 21, 1902. 
Syllabus by the Court. 
*905 1. Misappropriation of a trust fund does not 
entitle cestui que trust, merely as such, and for that 
reason alone, to a preference over general creditors of 
an insolvent trustee. 
2. In order to obtain a preference, cestui que trust 
must show that the estate out of which he claims such 
preference has been increased to some extent by the 
misappropriation of the trust property, and he is 
entitled to a preference to the extent of such increase 
only. 
3. Where a trustee mingles trust moneys with his 
own funds, cestui que trust is entitled to a charge 
upon the whole; and, so long as any portion of the 
mass into which the trust fund has entered remains in 
any form, it is subject to such charge, and may be 
followed and claimed. 
4. The burden is upon cestui que trust to show that 
the trust money did in fact increase the estate out of 
which he seeks a preference, or is represented therein 
in some form. But it seems that where such money 
has gone into the general estate of a trustee, who 
afterwards becomes insolvent, there is a presumption 
that it remains therein at his insolvency; and the court 
will not say that it cannot be traced or has wholly 
disappeared, where the contrary may fairly be 
inferred. 
5. It is presumed that moneys drawn out of a fund 
wherein the trustee has mingled his own money and 
that of cestui que trust are his own, and, so long as 
any portion of the fund so constituted remains, it may 
be followed, and the charge of cestui que trust 
thereon may be asserted. 
6. But if the whole of such fund, or a greater portion 
thereof than that representing the trustee's own 
money, is used by an insolvent trustee in paying his 
debts, cestui que trust is not entitled to a preference 
over general creditors for the amount of his money so 
lost. 
7. Property or assets of the insolvent trustee acquired 
before, or with the proceeds of property held before, 
the trust money came into his hands, and not in any 
way mingled therewith, are not subject to any lien or 
claim in cestui que trust, and the rights of the latter 
with respect thereto are those of a general creditor 
only. 
8. A change in the form of a portion of a fund in 
which money of the trustee personally and of cestui 
que trust has been mingled is not necessarily a 
withdrawal of such portion. When the trustee retains 
such portion and dissipates the remainder, the portion 
retained in the altered form is taken to represent such 
fund, and may be claimed by cestui que trust. 
9. Where a portion of a fund made up of trust money 
and of individual money of the trustee is invested, 
and a profit results, cestui que trust, in following the 
trust money into the investment, may claim such 
profits as the proceeds of the original fund upon 
which he had a charge, at least to the extent of said 
charge upon the original fund. 
*906 10. Capital Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, 
60 N. W. 115, 49 Neb. 786, 59 Am. St. Rep. 572, and 
State v. Midland State Bank, 71 N. W. 1011, 52 Neb. 
1, 66 Am. St. Rep. 484, limited. State v. Bank of 
Commerce, 75 N. W. 28, 54 Neb. 725, and Morrison 
v. Lincoln Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co., 77 N. W, 
655, 57 Neb. 225, adhered to. 
Commissioners' opinion. Department No. 2. Error to 
district court, Lancaster county; Holmes, Judge. 
In the matter of the insolvency of the Lincoln 
Savings Bank & Safe Deposit Company. In such 
matter the city of Lincoln intervenes, seeking a 
preference over the general creditors, and from the 
denial of the same it brings error. Reversed. 
West Headnotes 
Trusts €=>342 
390k342 Most Cited Cases 
Where the whole of a fund created by the moneys of 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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a trustee and those of his beneficiary is used by an 
insolvent trustee in paying his own debts, the 
beneficiary is not entitled to a preference over the 
general creditors for the amount of his money so lost. 
Trusts €=>342 
390k342 Most Cited Cases 
Misappropriation of a trust fund does not entitle the 
beneficiary for that reason alone to a preference over 
general creditors of an insolvent trustee. 
Trusts € ^ 3 4 2 
390k342 Most Cited Cases 
Assets of an insolvent trustee, acquired before or 
with the proceeds of property held before the trust 
money came into his hands, and not in any way 
mingled therewith, are not subject to any lien in favor 
of the beneficiary. 
Trusts €^^353 
390k353 Most Cited Cases 
The burden is on a beneficiary to show that the trust 
money did in fact increase the estate out of which he 
seeks a preference, or is represented therein in some 
form. 
Trusts €=>353 
390k353 Most Cited Cases 
Where a trustee retains a portion of a fund in which 
his own money and that of the beneficiary has been 
mingled, and dissipates the remainder, the portion 
retained may be claimed by the beneficiary. 
Trusts €>^353 
390k353 Most Cited Cases 
Where a trustee mingles trust property with his own 
funds, a beneficiary is entitled to a charge upon the 
whole, and, so long as any portion of the mass into 
which the trust fund has entered remains in any form, 
it is subject to such charge and may be followed and 
claimed. 
Trusts €=>353 
390k353 Most Cited Cases 
In order that a beneficiary of an insolvent trustee 
may obtain a preference, he must show that the estate 
out of which he claims such preference has been 
increased to some extent by the misappropriation of 
the trust property, entitling him to a preference to the 
extent of such increase. 
Trusts C=>354 
390k354 Most Cited Cases 
Where a portion of a fund made up of trust money 
and of individual money of the trustee is invested, 
and a profit results, the beneficiary, in following the 
trust money into the investment, may claim such 
profits as the proceeds of the original fund on which 
he had a charge, to the extent of said charge on the 
original fond. 
Trusts €=>358(2) 
390k358(2) Most Cited Cases 
Funds. 
Where trust money has been wrongfully commingled 
by a trustee with his own, and he makes payment 
from the common fund, it will be presumed that he 
paid out his own, and not trust, money. 
Lambertson & Hall, for plaintiff in error. 
A. S. Tibbetts and L. C. Burr, for defendants in error. 
POUND, C. 
This is a petition in error prosecuted by the city of 
Lincoln, an intervener in a suit brought to wind up 
the Lincoln Savings Bank & Safe Deposit Company, 
other phases whereof have been before this court 
several times. The plaintiff in error by its petition in 
intervention sought a preference over general 
creditors for some $5,000,—a balance of moneys of 
said city loaned to the bank upon certificate of 
deposit by the city treasurer in contravention of law, 
and with knowledge on the part of the bank officers 
as to whose money it was. It appeared from a 
stipulation of the parties and from the evidence 
adduced that on April 9, 1895, the city treasurer 
placed $6,095.35 of the city's funds in the bank, 
taking a certificate of deposit therefor. Afterwards 
$1,055.35 was paid on the certificate, and a new 
certificate was issued for $5,000. After said deposit 
was made, the bank had on deposit, in all, about 
$240,000, of which $41,699.96 was on hand in cash. 
On December 16, 1895, the bank suspended. At that 
time the deposits had fallen to about $150,000, or, to 
be precise, $92,534.43 had been paid out to 
depositors between the time when the city's money 
had been placed in the bank and the date of 
suspension. No money was loaned and no 
investments were made during this period, except 
that on April 16, 1895, the bank bought state warrants 
of the market value of $36,750, using in payment 
therefor $1,750 of the cash on hand, and $35,000 
borrowed of a bank in New York. The remainder of 
the cash on hand on April 9, 1895, and such moneys 
as accrued from collection or sale of paper already in 
the bank, it used in paying depositors and in running 
expenses. At the time the bank suspended there was 
but $200 cash on hand. This sum had been pledged to 
secure sureties upon a supersedeas bond in a case 
wherein judgment had been rendered against the 
bank, and was afterwards applied upon such 
judgment. A receiver was appointed on January 22, 
1896. When he took possession he received 
$1,562.61 in cash, and "cash items" to the amount of 
$239.07. He also received $3,334.37 from sale of the 
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warrants above referred to; such sum being the 
$1,750 originally invested therein, and the profit after 
repaying the money borrowed to make the purchase. 
But it appears from the evidence that the cash and 
cash items which came into the hands of the receiver 
accrued from loans made by the bank, or from paper 
which it held, before the city's money was deposited 
therein. The district court, upon this testimony, found 
generally for the receiver, and dismissed the city's 
petition. 
Under the rulings of this court in Morrison v. 
Lincoln Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co., 57 Neb. 225, 
77 N. W. 655, and State v. Bank of Commerce, 54 
Neb. 725, 75 N. W. 28, several of the questions 
raised may be disposed of readily. But the former 
case does not of necessity involve the questions 
presented by the case at bar, nor were the facts such 
as to require an affirmance of State v. Bank of 
Commerce, supra, while the latter case is vigorously 
assailed by counsel, and we are asked to overrule it, 
and to reaffirm the rule recognized in prior decisions. 
Ordinarily we should not feel justified in reviewing a 
question determined by two recent decisions of this 
court. Were it a mere matter of these two decisions, 
so long as we feel satisfied that they are sound, we 
should do no more than cite them, and proceed to 
apply them to this controversy. But in several prior 
cases (State v. State Bank of Wahoo, 42 Neb. 896, 61 
N. W. 252; State v. Midland State Bank, 52 Neb. 1, 
71 N. W. 1011, 66 Am. St. Rep. 484; and especially 
Capital Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 
786, 69 N. W. 115, 59 Am. St. Rep. 572) this court 
had expressly or by strong implication recognized 
and adopted a different rule. The cases last cited are 
sought to be distinguished in State v. Bank of 
Commerce, supra. Counsel have pointed out, 
however, that the attempt to distinguish the latter case 
from Capital Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, 
supra, is founded on an entire misapprehension of the 
facts there presented; and, in any event, the reasoning 
in these two cases and the authorities severally relied 
on therein cannot be reconciled. For this reason we 
think it expedient to state plainly that this court no 
longer adheres to the extreme view as to the right of 
cestui que trust to be preferred on insolvency of the 
trustee, expressed in the cases of State v. State Bank 
of Wahoo, State v. Midland State Bank, and Capital 
Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, but adheres to the 
position taken in State v. Bank of Commerce and 
Morrison v. Lincoln Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co., 
supra; to set forth our reasons for rejecting the one 
view and adopting the other; and to state as clearly 
and definitely as we may the rules by which causes 
such as the one at bar are to be decided. 
The origin of the rules now recognized *907 with 
respect to following trust money which has been 
mingled with the personal funds of the trustee, or has 
passed into his general estate, is to be found in the 
opinion of Jessel, M. R., in Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 
Ch. Div. 696. Prior to that decision it was said that 
money had no earmark, and that when a trust fund, in 
the form of money, became mingled with the moneys 
of the trustee personally, it lost its identity and could 
not be traced. Since that vigorous and convincing 
judgment, the idea that money, as such, could not be 
traced, and that trust property lost its identity when 
turned into money and confused with the trustee's 
funds, has been abandoned completely. But the limits 
of the extension of the rights of cestui que trust with 
respect to the property of insolvent trustees, to which 
the decision in Knatchbull v. Hallett gave rise, were 
not perceived at first. All which that decision did was 
to wipe out the old dogma that money had no 
earmark, and to substitute the sensible rule that 
whenever trust property enters into a mass, to which 
the property of cestui que trust and that of the trustee 
have contributed, so long as the trust property 
remains in or forms a part of such mass, cestui que 
trust has a claim or charge thereon to that extent, and 
general creditors cannot take advantage of or derive a 
benefit from, the increase in the assets due and 
traceable to misappropriation of the trust fund. 
Several courts in this country, however, went much 
further, and established a rule which, though 
generally abandoned or modified in the more recent 
authorities, is still adhered to in some quarters, and at 
one time had the support of the decisions of this 
court. McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 401, 28 N. W. 173, 
57 Am. Rep. 287; Bank v. Hummell, 14 Colo. 259, 
23 Pac. 986, 8 L. R. A. 788, 20 Am. St. Rep. 257; 
Peak v. Ellicott, 30 Kan. 156, 1 Pac. 499, 46 Am. 
Rep. 90; Myers v. Board, 51 Kan. 87, 32 Pac. 658, 37 
Am. St. Rep. 263; Evangelical Synod v. Schoensich, 
143 Mo. 652, 45 S. W. 647; Tierman's Ex'r v. 
Association, 152 Mo. 135, 53 S. W. 1072; 
Independent Dist. v. King, 80 Iowa, 497, 45 N. W. 
908; Plow Co. v. Lamp, 80 Iowa, 722, 45 N. W. 
1049, 20 Am. St. Rep. 442. The supreme court of 
Iowa has receded somewhat in District Tp. of Eureka 
v. Farmers' Bank of Fontanelle, 88 Iowa, 194, 55 N. 
W. 342. And a divided court in Wisconsin has 
overturned McLeod v. Evans, supra, which was itself 
the decision of a divided court. Silk Co. v. Flanders, 
87 Wis. 237, 58 N. W. 383. See, also, Bircher v. 
Walther (Mo.) 63 S. W. 691. But this court, in 
Capital Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, supra, 
expressly refused to follow the latter case, and 
adhered to McLeod v. Evans. In the view of these 
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authorities, if trust property has been misappropriated 
and has gone into the estate of the trustee, cestui que 
trust is to be preferred, and is to receive his money to 
the exclusion of general creditors. As the court put it 
in Capital Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, supra, 
the question is not one of identifying or claiming a 
sum actually deposited, but of compelling the 
insolvent to first restore the trust property, treating 
that as something which he had no power to 
commingle with other funds, but must keep whole 
and make up so long as he has any funds or property 
out of which to do so. Other cases do not go so far 
expressly, but reach the same result, either by holding 
that, if the insolvent trustee uses the whole fund to 
pay his debts, the effect is to increase his general 
estate, and create a charge thereon in favor of cestui 
que trust, or by ruling that, when the trust fund is 
once traced into the general property of the trustee, it 
is conclusively presumed to remain there. McLeod v. 
Evans, supra; Peak v. Ellicott, supra; Myers v. Board, 
supra; Independent Dist. v. King, supra. 
We are not able to agree to the rule just stated in any 
of the forms which it has assumed. We are satisfied 
that the court did well when, in State v. Bank of 
Commerce, it withdrew its support therefrom, and 
took a position in accord with the great weght of 
recent authority. The court was in error in saying (54 
Neb. 731, 75 N. W. 28) that the moneys which came 
into the hands of the receiver of the Capital National 
Bank on its insolvency were more than sufficient to 
meet the preferred claims established in Capital Nat. 
Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, supra, and its 
companion cases. Such sum was greater than the 
preferred claim established in any one suit, but the 
aggregate considerably exceeded it, and the record in 
each case showed that fact. Hence State v. Bank of 
Commerce is not reconcilable with prior decisions of 
the court, and must stand on its own foundation, 
which we think it may do safely. Not only is it in 
accord with the overwhelming majority of recent 
decisions upon this point, and with the general 
tendency to abandon or recede from McLeod v. 
Evans and the cases following that decision, but on 
principle it is clearly right. Of express decisions in 
the last three years upon this very point, we may cite 
Ellicott v. Kuhl, 60 N. J. Eq. 333, 46 Atl. 945; 
Collins v. Steuart, 58 N. J. Eq. 392, 44 Atl. 467; 
Same v. Lewis, 60 N. J. Eq. 488, 46 Atl. 1098; 
Mercantile Co. v. Melbye, 78 Minn. 357, 81 N. W. 
20; Beard v. Independent Dist., 60 U. S. App. 372, 31 
C. C. A. 562, 88 Fed. 375; Robinson v. Woodward 
(Ky.) 48 S. W. 1082; Wilbern v. Timmons, 55 S. C. 
466, 33 S. E. 568; Byrne v. McGrath, 130 Cai. 316, 
62 Pac. 559, 80 Am. St. Rep. 127; Shutt v. Hinman, 
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265; Bircher v. Walther (Mo.) 63 S. W. 691. These 
cases, and many others cited in State v. Bank of 
Commerce, supra, and Morrison v. Lincoln Sav. 
Bank & Safe Deposit Co., supra, establish clearly that 
misappropriation of a trust fund does not entitle 
cestui que trust, merely *908 as such, and for that 
reason alone, to a preference over general creditors of 
an insolvent trustee. So long as the trust property, in 
any shape or form, can be recognized, it belongs to 
cestui que trust. So long as it enters into any fund 
property, or mass of assets in any way, cestui que 
trust has a charge or lien, which he may enforce upon 
the whole. But if the trustee "destroys a trust fund by 
dissipating it altogether, there remains nothing to be 
the subject of the trust." Wood, V. C, in Frith v. 
Cartland, 2 Hem. & M. 417. In such case, cestui que 
trust has no specific claim against any property or 
fond. He is merely a creditor of the trustee, and 
stands on the same basis as other creditors. The right 
to a preference is based on his ownership of some 
specific fund or assets, or on a claim or charge upon 
all the fond or assets, because his property is 
contained in, or has contributed to, them. In other 
words, to obtain a preference, cestui que trust must 
show that the estate out of which he claims such 
preference has been increased to some extent by the 
misappropriation of the trust property, and he is 
entitled to a preference to the extent of such increase 
only. This proposition in no way detracts from, and is 
but another way of stating, the general rule, 
announced in the cases cited, that, where a trustee 
mingles trust moneys with his own funds, cestui que 
trust is entitled to a charge upon the whole, and, so 
long as any portion of the mass into which the trust 
fond has entered remains in any form, it is subject to 
such charge, and may be followed and claimed. In 
State v. Bank of Commerce and Morrison v. Lincoln 
Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co. it was held that the 
burden is upon cestui que trust to show that the trust 
money did in fact increase the estate out of which he 
seeks a preference, or is represented therein in some 
form. This is only to say that a plaintiff must prove 
his case. He claims a specific fond as his, or he 
claims a charge on the general mass of assets, and he 
must show the facts to justify his claim. But we think 
this should not be pushed too far. When it is once 
proved that trust money has gone into the general 
estate of a trustee who afterwards becomes insolvent, 
it would seem that we ought to presume, in the 
absence of other evidence, that it remains therein at 
his insolvency, and that we ought not to say it cannot 
be traced, or has wholly disappeared, where the 
contrary may fairly be inferred. Sherwood v. Bank, 
103 Mich. 109, 61 N. W. 352; Independent Dist. v. 
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King, 80 Iowa, 498, 45 N. W. 908. In the case at bar 
the city showed that its money was put into, and 
became part of, the general fund of "cash on hand" in 
the bank. It appeared also that the receiver came into 
possession of cash or "cash items" amounting to 
some $2,000. If these facts stood alone, we should 
feel obliged to allow the city a preference to the 
extent of what came into the receiver's hands when he 
took possession. State v. Bank of Commerce, 54 Neb. 
725, 75 N. W. 28. But as the evidence stands, it is 
clearly proved that the cash and cash items taken over 
by the receiver do not represent the city's money in 
any form. The city's money entered into, and was part 
of, the $41,000 cash on hand on April 9, 1895. The 
city had a charge on that fund for its money. 
Whatever moneys were drawn out of that fund and 
dissipated are presumed to be those of the bank. The 
portion that remains in the bank, in whatever form, is 
taken to be and represent the trust fund, and to be 
liable to be followed and claimed as such by the city. 
But if the whole of the cash on hand into which the 
city's money entered, or a greater portion thereof than 
that representing the bank's own money, was used in 
paying off other depositors or in running expenses, 
the city is not entitled to a preference over general 
creditors for the amount of its money so lost. 
Morrison v. Lincoln Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co., 
57 Neb. 725, 77 N. W. 655; Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N. 
Y. 256, 11 N. E. 504; Collins v. Steuart, 58 N. J. Eq. 
392, 44 Atl. 467; Ellicott v. Kuhl, 60 N. J. Eq. 333, 
46Atl. 945. 
All of the cash on hand after the city's money 
became mixed therein, with the exception of the 
$1,750 used in the purchase of warrants, which will 
be considered presently, and the $200 in the bank 
when it suspended, was used in paying debts and 
expenses. The $200, as has been seen, was pledged to 
indemnify sureties on the bank's bond, was 
afterwards paid on the judgment superseded thereby, 
and never came into the receiver's control. In other 
words, except said sum of $1,750, it was wholly 
dissipated. Although there are decisions to the effect 
that the mere fact of use of the money in the trustee's 
general business or in paying his debts is, in effect, 
an increase of the assets, and suffices to create a 
charge thereon, that position is entirely at variance 
with the principle by which such cases must be 
governed, and is repudiated by all the later 
authorities. Spokane Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 29 U. S. 
App. 707, 66 C. C. A. 85, 68 Fed. 979; Metropolitan 
Nat. Bank v. Campbell Commission Co. (C. C.) 77 
Fed. 27; Bank v. Latimer (C. C.) 67 Fed. 705; Bircher 
v. Walther (Mo.) 63 S. W. 691. As the court said in 
Spokane Co. v. First Nat. Bank, supra, "even if it is 
proven that the trust fund has been but recently 
disbursed, and has been used to pay debts that 
otherwise would be claims against the estate, there 
would be manifest inequity in requiring that the 
money so paid out should be refunded out of the 
assets; for in so doing the general creditors, whose 
demands remain unpaid, are, in effect, contributing to 
the payment of the creditors whose demands have 
been extinguished by the trust fund." Moreover in 
this case the money which came *909 into the hands 
of the receiver when he was appointed was the 
proceeds of loans made before the city's money came 
into the bank. For reasons already stated, it must be 
manifest that property or assets of the insolvent 
trustee acquired before, or with the proceeds of 
property held before, the trust money came into his 
hands, and not in any way mingled therewith, are not 
subject to any lien or claim in cestui que trust, and 
that the rights of the latter with respect thereto are 
those of a general creditor only. District Tp. of 
Eureka v. Farmers' Bank of Fontanelle, 88 Iowa, 194, 
55 N. W. 342. 
We come now to the money derived fromtsale of the 
warrants. It will be remembered that after the city's 
money came into the bank it bought the warrants, 
using $1,750 of the moneys in which the funds of the 
city had been mixed, and $35,000 borrowed on 
security of the warrants. The receiver contends that 
since there was over $40,000 in cash in the bank at 
the time, of which but $6,000 belonged to the city, it 
will be presumed that the $1,750 was the bank's own 
money. Such would be the case, without doubt, had 
the bank withdrawn the money and dissipated it in 
some fashion. But it did not do this. It merely 
changed the form of a portion of the fund in which 
the city's money had been wrongfully mixed. After 
purchase of the warrants said fund was represented 
by the cash still in the bank, and by the bank's interest 
in the warrants. State warrants are readily convertible 
into cash. If the bank preferred to keep part of its 
cash fund as warrants, the identity of the fund was 
not changed. So long as any portion of the fund into 
which the city's money entered may be traced into 
money which came to the receiver, the city may 
assert the claim which it had upon the whole fund. 
The warrants were all that remained of that fund. In 
accordance with the presumption that whatever was 
retained and not dissipated was the city's money, and 
not the bank's, these warrants and their proceeds in 
the hands of the receiver represent money to which 
the city has a prior claim, and in which general 
creditors have no right to share. The city's right to 
follow the money does not fail because no one can 
say what part of the cash on hand in the bank went 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
90N.W.905 Page 6 
57 L.R.A. 885, 64 Neb. 822, 90 N.W. 905 
(Cite as: 90 N.W. 905) 
into the warrants. The city had a charge upon the 
whole in any form in which the bank might keep it. 
When all was wasted except the warrants, that charge 
remained upon them, because they were a part of that 
fund, though in an altered form. Knatchbull v. 
Hallett, 13 Ch. Div. 696; Bank v. Peters, 123 N. Y. 
272, 25 N. E. 319; Byrne v. McGrath, 130 Cal. 316, 
62 Pac. 559, 80 Am. St. Rep. 127; Bank v. King, 57 
Pa. 202, 98 Am. Dec. 215; Smith v. Combs, 49 N. J. 
Eq. 420, 24 Atl. 9; Third Nat. Bank v. Stillwater Gas 
Co., 36 Minn. 75, 30 N. W. 440. We do not think this 
view of the transaction in question conflicts in any 
way with the holding of Bradley, J., in Frelinghuysen 
v. Nugent (C. C.) 36 Fed. 229, followed in Central 
Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 104 U. 
S. 54, 26 L. Ed. 693, and Peters v. Bain, 133 U. S. 
670, 10 Sup. Ct. 354, 33 L. Ed. 696, and approved in 
Morrison v. Lincoln Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co., 
57 Neb. 225, 77 N. W. 655. In Frelinghuysen v. 
Nugent, the cashier of a bank had wrongfully turned 
over large sums to a partnership engaged in 
manufacturing, under such circumstances as to make 
the latter constructive trustees. The evidence 
indicated that the money had been entirely dissipated, 
and there was nothing to show that the stock on hand 
represented the trust fund, or a fund with which it had 
been mixed in any form. On the contrary, it was clear 
that said stock had been bought recently on credit, 
and represented the debts of general creditors. But in 
the case at bar a portion of the fund into which the 
city's money entered is traced directly into the 
warrants, in which form that portion was held till the 
bank suspended. The warrants were a cash asset, and 
the money thus held was still fairly to be called a part 
of the cash fund. It was not made way with, and it 
came into the receiver's hands, on sale of the 
warrants, as the last remnant of the fund with which 
the city's money had been mixed. The city had a 
charge upon the warrants, as upon the fund with a 
portion whereof they were bought, for the full 
amount of its moneys contained in said fund. Hence 
its claim upon the proceeds is not limited to the 
$1,750 which was used in buying them, but extends 
to the profit accruing therefrom, as well. The 
$3,334.37 which came into the hands of the receiver 
upon sale of the warrants represents the cash fund in 
which the city's money was mixed, and the profits of 
an investment of that fund. The profits of trust money 
belong to cestui que trust, and we see no warrant for 
limiting recovery to the actual sum invested, 
especially where there is not enough, in any event, to 
satisfy the charge on the original fund. Farmers' & 
Traders' Bank v. Kimball Milling Co., 1 S. D. 388, 47 
N. W. 402, 36 Am. St. Rep. 739; Brown v. Ricketts, 
4 Johns. Ch. 303, 8 Am. Dec. 567; Frank's Appeal, 
59 Pa. 190; Butler v. Hicks, 11 Smedes & M. 78. 
We therefore recommend that the order of the 
district court be reversed, and the cause remanded, 
with directions to enter a new order granting the city 
a preference to the extent of the proceeds of said 
warrants, namely, $3,334.37. 
BARNES and OLDEAM, CC, concur. 
PER CURIAM. 
For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the 
order of the district court is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded, with directions to enter an order granting 
the plaintiff in error a preference to the extent of 
$3,334.37. 
57 L.R.A. 885, 64 Neb. 822, 90 N.W. 905 
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Nos. 2,253, 2,254. 
January 7, 1913. 
Deposits in bank after insolvency, see note to 
Richardson v. New Orleans Coffee Co., 43 CCA. 
588.) 
Appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States 
for the Northern Division of the Western District of 
Michigan; Arthur C Denison, Judge. 
Bill by John Brennan against Philip Tillinghast, as 
receiver of the First National Bank of Ironwood, 
Mich. From a decree awarding complainant a part of 
the relief demanded, both parties appeal. Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
Appeal and Error €^^719(9) 
30k719(9) Most Cited Cases 
Where plaintiffs claim against defendant bank was 
allowed as an offset in accordance with the prayer of 
complainant's bill, and no error was assigned with 
reference thereto, the court would not review an 
objection that it should have been allowed as an 
offset against complainant's claim as a general 
creditor. 
Banks and Banking 
52k75 Most Cited Cases 
Where a bank receives deposits with knowledge that 
it cannot pay its debts, and must fail in business, the 
depositor may reclaim it if he can trace it into the 
bank's assets coming into the hands of the receiver. 
Banks and Banking 
52k75 Most Cited Cases 
Mere insolvency of a bank at the time it received a 
deposit from complainant held insufficient to entitle 
him to rescind and recover the deposit from the 
receiver, where it did not appear that the bank's 
officers did not have reasonable hopes that by 
continuing in business the bank might retrieve its 
fortunes. 
Banks and Banking C ^ 7 5 
52k75 Most Cited Cases 
Receipt of a deposit from a customer with 
knowledge that the bank was insolvent does not 
constitute such fraud as would authorize a rescission, 
where it was received with the understanding that it 
should be used to pay the depositor's debt to the bank. 
Banks and Banking € ^ 8 0 ( 6 ) 
52k80(6) Most Cited Cases 
An insolvent bank having wrongfully converted 
certain stock deposited with it as collateral security, 
the owner held to have sufficiently followed the 
proceeds into the hands of the bankrupt's receiver to 
entitle him to a preferred claim thereto. 
Trusts €=>352 
390k352 Most Cited Cases 
Where proceeds of stock wrongfully sold by a bank 
constituted a trust fund, it did not lose such character 
by being mingled with other moneys of the bank. 
Trusts €=>358(2) 
390k358(2) Most Cited Cases 
Proof that a tortfeasor has mingled trust funds with 
his own and made payments thereafter out of the 
common fund is a sufficient identification of the 
remainder as constituting a trust fund. 
Trusts € = 3 7 2 ( 1 ) 
390k372(l) Most Cited Cases 
The presumption that a tort-feasor, having mingled 
trust funds with his own, drew out his own moneys, 
and that the balance included the trust fund, is a mere 
presumption, which will not stand against evidence to 
the contrary. 
Trusts € ^ 3 7 2 ( 1 ) 
390k372(l) Most Cited Cases 
The presumption that a tort-feasor, having mingled 
trust funds with funds of his own, first paid out his 
own funds, has no application where the payment 
was a mere transfer of a part of the fund in a 
substituted form to another fund retained in his 
possession. 
*611 Charles M. Humphrey, of Ironwood, Mich., for 
John Brennan. 
I. A. Fish and Quarles, Spence & Quarles, all of 
Milwaukee, Wis., for the receiver. 
Before WARRINGTON and KNAPPEN, Circuit 
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Judges, and SANFORD, District judge. 
SANFORD, District Judge. 
John Brennan, the complainant below, filed a bill in 
the Circuit Court, sitting in equity, against the First 
National Bank of Ironwood, Mich., an insolvent 
banking association, and Philip Tillinghast, receiver 
of said bank, the defendants below, seeking to 
recover as preferred claims against the bank the value 
of certain stock deposited by Brennan with the bank 
as collateral and sold by the bank, and the sum of 
$1,000 deposited by Brennan with the bank a short 
time before it was placed in the hands of the receiver. 
The court, on final hearing, allowed the first of these 
items as a preferred claim, and disallowed the 
second. Brennan and the receiver have each 
appealed from this decree; and the two appeals have 
been heard together. 
The material facts are these: 
The First National Bank of Ironwood, Mich., 
hereinafter called the Ironwood Bank, was organized 
as a national banking association in 1888, and 
conducted a banking business in Ironwood until June 
21, 1909, when it closed its doors, and Tillinghast 
was appointed as its receiver by the Comptroller of 
the Currency. 
On February 1, 1909, Brennan borrowed from the 
Ironwood Bank the sum of $1,000, for which he 
executed his promissory note, due in four months, 
with interest, and deposited with the bank as 
collateral security certificates for certain shares of 
mining stock, including 200 shares of the capital 
stock of the Shattuck-Arizona Copper Company. 
On April 8th Brennan deposited with the Ironwood 
Bank the sum of $1,000, for which he received a 
certificate of deposit. This deposit was received by 
the cashier of the bank, with the understanding at the 
time that it was to be used in paying Brennan's note at 
its maturity. 
The receiver admitted in his answer that the bank 
was insolvent from February 1st, when the note was 
given, to June 21st, when the receiver was appointed, 
including the date, April 8th, on which the deposit 
was received; and the cashier who received the 
deposit testified that he had known for about ten 
years before that the bank was insolvent. 
On May 1st the Ironwood Bank, through its cashier, 
without the knowledge or consent of Brennan, sold 
195 of the shares of the stock of the Shattuck-Arizona 
Copper Company which it held as collateral to his 
note, the proceeds of which, $3,558.75, were on that 
day deposited in the City National Bank of Duluth, 
Minn., hereinafter called the Duluth Bank, to the 
credit of the Ironwood Bank, in a pre-existing open 
account. 
Against this open account in the Duluth Bank, in 
which other deposits were made from time to time, 
the Ironwood Bank drew from day to day various 
drafts to meet its daily clearing house balances. *612 
And from May 1st to May 8th, inclusive, the 
Ironwood Bank also drew four drafts on the Duluth 
Bank against this open account, in favor of the 
American Express Company, for amounts 
aggregating $2,807.32. These drafts were purchased 
by the express company from the Ironwood Bank on 
the dates on which they were drawn, and the express 
company on such dates paid the Ironwood Bank the 
amounts of such drafts, in cash, over its counter. At 
all times from May 1st to May 10th, inclusive, the 
open account of the Ironwood Bank at the Duluth 
Bank, after crediting all deposits made and deducting 
all drafts drawn, showed a balance in favor of the 
Ironwood Bank, varying in amount from day to day, 
but always in excess of $3,558.75. On May 10th this 
balance amounted to $4,273.39. On May 11th, 
however, this account of the Ironwood Bank at the 
Duluth Bank was overdrawn in the sum of $1,068.75. 
On June 14th, after Brennan's note had fallen due 
and when he did not know that any part of his stock 
had been sold by the Ironwood Bank, he, after a 
conversation with its cashier, who advised him to let 
the note run, gave up his original intention of paying 
his note with his certificate of deposit, and, instead, 
paid the Ironwood Bank the interest due on his note, 
and gave the bank a renewal note for the principal. 
In addition to these transactions, Brennan also had a 
checking account with the Ironwood Bank, and, when 
its doors closed, owed it for an overdraft on this 
account the sum of $216.07. 
The books of the Ironwood Bank furthermore show 
that at all times from February 1st until it closed on 
June 21st there was $8,000 or more of cash on hand 
in its vaults, and $15,652.23 in cash came into the 
hands of the receiver. And, while it appears that the 
bank books contained many false cash entries, the 
evidence fully sustains the finding of the court below 
that from and after April 8th until the closing of the 
bank it had continually on hand in cash in its own 
vaults more than $3,500. 
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The remainder of the stock held by the bank as 
collateral on Brennan's note has been returned by the 
receiver to Brennan. 
The evidence further showed that claims had been 
filed against the Ironwood Bank aggregating 
$603,000; that the Comptroller of the Currency had 
levied an assessment of 100 per cent, on its 
stockholders; that 30 per cent, dividends had already 
been paid to creditors; that not exceeding 10 per cent, 
more could be paid; and that the other claims for 
preferences which had been filed and which were still 
pending aggregated between $3,500 and $4,000. 
On this state of facts we have reached the following 
conclusions: 
[1] 1. The court below correctly held that Brennan 
was entitled to recover as a preferential claim, to be 
paid in full, the sum of $3,558.75 received by the 
Ironwood Bank from the sale of his stock, less the 
amount of his note, $1,000, and of the overdraft, 
$216.07, leaving a balance of $2,342.68, for which 
sum he was granted a decree against the receiver. 
[2] It is undisputed that the proceeds of the sale of 
Brennan's stock, wrongfully converted by the 
Ironwood Bank to its own use, constituted *613 a 
trust fund, which did not lose this character when 
mingled with other moneys of the bank, and that 
Brennan was entitled to recover the amount thereof 
as a preferred claim, if, and to the extent that, he 
sustained the burden of proof of tracing this money, 
either in its original shape or in a substituted form, 
into the moneys which came into the hands of the 
receiver as part of the assets of the bank. Peters v. 
Bain, 133 U.S. 670, 693, 10 Sup.Ct. 354, 33 L.Ed. 
696; Board of Commissioners v. Strawn (CCA. 6) 
157 Fed. 49, 54, 84 CCA. 553, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 
1100; In re Brown (CCA. 2) 193 Fed. 24, 29, 113 
C C A . 343, affirmed sub nom. First National Bank 
of Princeton v. Littlefield, 226 U.S. 110, 33 Sup.Ct. 
78, 57 L.Ed ; Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll 
County (CCA. 8) 194 Fed. 593, 604, 114 CCA. 
435, and cases cited. 
[3] And proof that the tort-feasor has mingled the 
trust funds with his own and made payments 
thereafter out of the common fund, is, nothing else 
appearing, a sufficient identification of the remainder 
of that fund coming into the hands of the receiver, not 
exceeding the smallest amount the fund contained 
subsequent to the commingling, as trust property, 
under the legal presumption that he regarded the law 
and neither paid out the trust fund nor invested it in 
other property, but kept it sacred. Board of 
Commissioners v. Strawn, supra, at page 51; Empire 
State Surety Co. v. Carroll County, supra, at page 
605, and cases cited. 
Applying these general principles, we are of opinion 
that the court below correctly held that the proceeds 
of the sale of Brennan's stock constituted a trust fund 
held by the Ironwood Bank for his benefit; that the 
transactions in connection with the four cash drafts 
drawn in favor of the express company constituted, in 
effect, a transfer of $2,807.32 of this trust fund in 
cash to the vaults of the Ironwood Bank; that this 
portion of the trust fund must be deemed to have 
remained in the vaults of the Ironwood Bank as part 
of the trust fund, in cash, until it came into the 
possession of the receiver; and that as the amount 
thus remaining in the trust fund was more than 
sufficient to cover the balance to which Brennan was 
entitled from the proceeds of the sale of his stock, 
after deducting the amount due from him to the bank 
on his note and overdrafts, he had successfully traced 
the balance of the trust fund thus due to him into the 
cash assets that came into the hands of the receiver, 
and was hence entitled to be paid the same as a 
preferential claim. 
It is urged, however, in behalf of the receiver that the 
cash draft transactions should not be regarded as a 
transfer of $2,807.32 of this trust fund to the vaults of 
the Ironwood Bank, for the reason that, after the last 
of these cash drafts was drawn on May 8th, there 
remained to the credit of the Ironwood Bank at the 
Duluth Bank until May 10th a balance of $4,273.39, 
or more than the amount of the trust fund, which was 
not dissipated until this balance was changed into an 
overdraft of $1,068.75 on May 11th; the argument 
being that under this state of facts it should be 
presumed that the Ironwood Bank first drew on its 
open account in the Duluth Bank for its own 
purposes, intending to leave the trust fund 
unimpaired; that the $4,273.*614 39 remaining in the 
Duluth Bank on May 10th hence included the trust 
fund; and that, as this balance was subsequently 
dissipated by drafts drawn by the Ironwood Bank for 
its own purposes, it cannot, for that reason, be traced 
into the cash which came into the hands of the 
receiver from the vaults of the bank. 
[4] It is true that in the case of blended moneys in a 
bank account, consisting in part of trust funds, from 
which there have been drawings from time to time, it 
has been held, in favor of the cestui que trust, as a 
presumption of law, that the sums first drawn out 
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were from the moneys which the tort-feasor had a 
right to expend in his own business, and that the 
balance which remained included the trust fund, 
which he had no right to use. In re Hallett's Estate, 
13 Ch.D. 696, 727; Board of Commissioners v. 
Strawn, supra, at page 51. It is clear, however, in the 
first place, that this is a mere presumption, which will 
not stand against evidence to the contrary. Board of 
Commissioners v. Strawn, supra, at page 51. 
[5] And it is furthermore clear that this rule of 
presumption has no application where the evidence 
shows that the first moneys drawn out of the mingled 
fund by the tort-feasor were not in fact dissipated by 
him at all, but were merely transferred, in a 
substituted form, to another fund retained in his own 
possession. In such case, it must be held that the 
trust attaches to the substituted form in which the 
property is retained by the tort-feasor, and that the 
right to follow the trust in such form is not lost by 
reason of the fact that the tort-feasor thereafter draws 
out and spends for his own purposes the balance of 
the fund in which the trust money was originally 
mingled. The English case of In re Oatway, L.R. 2 
Ch. 356, 359 directly sustains this view. In that case 
Oatway, a joint trustee under a will, had sold a 
portion of the trust property and deposited the 
proceeds to his own credit in bank with other funds 
belonging to himself. Out of this deposit, consisting 
in part of the proceeds of the converted trust fund and 
in part of his own moneys, Oatway purchased certain 
shares of stock in the Oceana Company, which he 
took and retained in his own name. Thereafter he 
drew out and paid away irrevocably for his own 
individual purposes the entire remainder of the bank 
deposit. It was held that, under this state of facts, the 
cestui que trust was entitled to follow the shares of 
stock thus purchased by Oatway. Joyce, J., said: 
'If money held by any person in a fiduciary capacity 
be paid into his own banking account, it may be 
followed by the equitable owner, who, as against the 
trustee, will have a charge for what belongs to him 
upon the balance to the credit of the account. If, 
then, the trustee pays in further sums, and from time 
to time draws out moneys by checks, but leaves a 
balance to the credit of the account, it is settled that 
he is not entitled to * * * maintain that the sums 
which have been drawn out and paid away so as to be 
incapable of being recovered represented pro tanto 
the trust money, and that the balance remaining is not 
trust money, but represents only his own money paid 
into the account. * * * It is, in my opinion, equally 
clear that when any of the money drawn out has been 
invested, and the investment remains in the name or 
under the control of the trustee, the rest of the balance 
having been afterwards dissipated by him, he cannot 
maintain that the investment which remains 
represents his own money alone, and that what has 
been spent and can no longer be traced and recovered 
was the money belonging to the trust. *615 * * * The 
order of priority in which the various withdrawals 
and investments may have been respectively made is 
wholly immaterial. * * * In the present case there is 
no balance left. The only investment or property 
remaining which represents any part of the mixed 
money paid into the banking account is the Oceana 
shares purchased for . . . 2,137. Upon these, 
therefore, the trust had a charge for the . . . 3,000 trust 
money paid into the account. That is to say, those 
shares and the proceeds thereof belong to the trust. 
The investment by Oatway, in his own name, of the . 
. . 2,137 in Oceana shares no more got rid of the 
claim or charge of the trust upon the money so 
invested than would have been the case if he had 
drawn a check for . . . 2,137 and simply placed and 
retained the amount in a drawer without further 
disposing of the money in any way. The proceeds of 
the Oceana shares must be held to belong to the trust 
funds under the will of which Oatway and Maxwell 
Skipper were the trustees.1 
In like manner we are of opinion that in the present 
case it must be held that the transfer by the Ironwood 
Bank to its own vaults, through the cash draft 
transactions, of $2,807.32, of the balance standing to 
its credit in the Duluth Bank in which the trust fund 
had been mingled, did not divest the money thus 
transferred of its character as a trust fund, but as this 
money remained thereafter in its own vaults and in its 
own custody, and subsequently passed into the hands 
of the receiver as part of the cash assets of the bank, 
it remained subject in all respects to the trust 
originally impressed upon the proceeds of the sale of 
Brennan's stock. 
2. The court below correctly held that the amount of 
the $1,000 deposit was not a preferred claim, but that 
as to this sum Brennan was a general creditor of the 
Ironwood Bank, to be paid by the receiver the same 
percentage of dividends that had been and should be 
paid to other general creditors. 
[6] It is true that where a bank, being hopelessly 
insolvent, receives a deposit, with the knowledge that 
it cannot pay its debts and must fail in business, this 
is such a fraud upon the depositor that he may rescind 
the contract of deposit and reclaim the amount so 
deposited or its proceeds, if traced into the assets of 
the bank coming into the hands of the receiver, in like 
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manner as other trust funds. St. Louis Ry. Co. v. 
Johnston, 133 U.S. 566, 576, 10 Sup.Ct. 390, 33 
L.Ed. 683; Standard Oil Co. v. Hawkins (CCA. 7) 
74 Fed. 395, 398, 20 CCA. 468, 33 L.R.A. 739; City 
Bank v. Blackmore (CCA. 6) 75 Fed. 771, 773, 21 
CCA. 514; Richardson v. Coffee Co. (CCA. 5) 102 
Fed. 785, 789, 43 CCA. 583; Hutchinson v. Le Roy 
(CCA. 1) 113 Fed. 202, 209, 51 CCA. 159. 
[7] However, the mere fact that the bank is known to 
be insolvent at the time the deposit is received is not 
in our opinion sufficient of itself, without more, to 
confer this right of rescission upon the depositor, and 
such right of rescission would not arise when the 
bank at the time of receiving the deposit, although 
embarrassed and insolvent, yet had reason to believe 
that by continuing in business it might retrieve its 
fortunes; the necessary condition upon which the 
right of rescission is predicated being that the deposit 
was received when the bank was hopelessly 
embarrassed and so circumstanced as to constitute its 
receipt of the deposit a fraud upon the depositor. See 
St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Johnston, supra, at pages 576, 
577. 
*616 In the present case it merely appears that the 
bank was insolvent at the time this deposit was 
received, and had been known to be insolvent for ten 
years previously by the cashier who received the 
deposit. The extent of its insolvency at that time is 
not shown, nor is there any evidence as to what 
subsequent events precipitated the condition which 
caused its doors to close, or whether or not at the 
time the deposit was received the bank, although 
embarrassed and insolvent, yet had reasonable hopes 
that by continuing in business it might retrieve its 
fortunes, just as it had previously continued in 
business for the ten preceding years during which it 
had been insolvent. In the light of this meager 
evidence, we agree in the view expressed by Judge 
Denison, then district judge, who heard this case 
below, who said: 
There is no reason to think in this case that the 
suspension of the bank was any more imminent on 
April 8th than it had been for a long time, or that the 
cashier or bank officers anticipated the closing of the 
bank or had any expectation that complainant would 
not receive his money when he should ask for it~ 
except their general and vague fear that they might 
fail to tide over their difficulties. This does not seem 
to me to raise the necessary trust. Complainant's own 
showing is that for more than 60 days the deposit 
would have been repaid on demand, and that it was 
practically offered to complainant when the note was 
renewed. For these reasons, I think complainant is 
not entitled to any preference upon his certificate of 
deposit, but should prove the same as a general 
creditor.' 
[8] And, whatever would have been the result 
otherwise, we think it cannot properly be held that 
the receipt of this particular deposit constituted a 
fraud upon Brennan within the rule entitling him to 
follow it as a trust fund, in the light of the undisputed 
facts, shown by his own testimony that at the time the 
deposit was made the bank held his $1,000 note for 
borrowed money, and the deposit was made with the 
'understanding' that it would be used in payment of 
this note at maturity. As this deposit was hence, 
under this evidence, in effect taken by the bank as 
quasi security for the payment of a just debt due to 
itself, this circumstance alone, in our opinion, 
relieves the bank from the imputation of fraud in 
receiving the deposit, which might otherwise have 
existed if the deposit had been merely received in the 
ordinary course of dealings between the bank and a 
customer not indebted to it. 
[9] 3. It is furthermore suggested in behalf of 
Brennan that the court below should have allowed his 
$1,000 note as an offset against his claim as general 
creditor under his certificate of deposit, instead of 
allowing it, in effect, as an offset against his preferred 
claim arising out of the sale of his collateral. It is 
frankly conceded, however, in the brief filed in his 
behalf that the opposite view was taken by his 
counsel in the court below, and it appears, from an 
examination of the pleadings, that the decree of the 
court below in allowing this offset against Brennan's 
preferred claim for the proceeds of his stock was 
entirely consistent with the prayer of the 
complainant's bill. Furthermore, Brennan, under his 
appeal, has assigned no error in reference to the 
action of the court in this respect. In this state of the 
record there is obviously nothing in the decree of the 
court below in this respect of which Brennan is 
entitled to now complain. 
*617 4. Finding no error in the decree below, it must 
be in all things affirmed. A decree will be entered 
accordingly, dismissing both appeals, and taxing each 
appellant with one-half of the costs of the appeals. 
201 F. 609, 120 CCA. 37 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Tab 9 
356 OHANOERY DIVISION. 
JOYCE J. 
1903 
April 22, 24; 
May 2. . 
In re OAT WAY. -... 
HEKTSLET v. OATWAY. 
[1902 0. 273.] 
Trustee—Breach of Trust—Following Trust Money—Banking Account—}£$ 
\ Fund—Investment—Appropriation of Fayments. 
Where a trustee paid trust money into his banking account whWebi 
it became mixed with his own money, and out of moneys drawn fromtilf 
account purchased an investment in his own name, but subseq'ue^^P 
.applied the balance to his own. purposes, his representatives caijnof 
successfully maintain that the investment was purchased out o p $ | | 
trustee's own money, and that what has been spent, and can no h^m 
be traced and recovered, was the money belonging to the trust. 
Frown v. Adams, (1869) L. B. 4 Ch. 764, is overruled .by In re F^sWjjl 
Estate, (1880) 13 Oh. D. 696. 
THIS was a creditor's action for the administration of i 
estate of Lewis John Oatway, a solicitor, who died insolvefl 
in 1902. The defendant Christiana Mary Oatway was 1 
sole executrix. In the course of the administration a quesftof| 
arose as to the title to a sum of 2474JL 19s., being the proceeds^ 
sale of 1000 shares in ai company called the Oceana Companf! 
• which at the date of the testator's death were standing m € | | 
name. 
The testator and one Maxwell Skipper were co-trustees un'dl 
the will of Charles Skipper, deceased. In 1899' and 1900.stim|| 
amounting to 3000Z. were advanced in breach of trust ouMl 
Charles Skipper's estate to Maxwell Skipper upon the secuif§| 
of a mortgage of an undivided share of certain real estate S 
which he was entitled under his grandfather's will. In 19|1 
Maxwell Skipper went abroad, having given to Oatway a powl| 
of attorney under which and as mortgagee he on August 'ijm 
1901, sold Maxwell Skipper's reversionary interest for the stM 
of 7000Z. This sum Oatway paid into his own banking accoui|S 
which at that time was in credit to .the extent of 771.13^«|S 
He did not replace the 3000Z. which had been advanced
 tW 
Maxwell Skipper out of Charles Skipper's trust estate. . ; . |H 
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^Oatway in the sum of 1779Z. 7s. Id., and also in a further JOYOE or. 
|tinascertiained amount in respect of costs.. : 
%$•< On August 24, 1901, Oatway purchased the Oceana shares 
If or 2137Z, 125. 3d., which he paid for by a cheque on his 
l ink ing account. Before the purchase of the shares Oatway 
Ijiad made further payments into the account to the extent 
iof 301. Is. lid., and. had drawn out sums amounting to 
|i510L8s. Qd.; so that when he drew the cheque for 2137Z. 12s. 3d. 
i|in payment for the shares the credit balance of his account 
||was*6635Z. 6s. Ad., which sum included the 3000Z. belonging 
p o the estate of Charles Skipper. 
|p. After paying for the shares, Oatway paid further sums 
pinto the account, but his subsequent drawings for his own 
purposes exhausted the whole amount standing to his credit, 
|and there was nothing to represent the 3000Z. except the 
^proceeds of the Oceana shares. 
1|^ This was a summons taken out by Maxwell Skipper, who 
||was also a defendant to the action, asking that the sum of 
2^474?.* 19s., being the proceeds of the Oceana shares, might be 
ifgaid to him either in his personal capacity or as trustee under 
jj|.the will of Charles Skipper. 
WiAvAten-GarimeU, for the .applicant. Oatway was bound 
pwhen he received the 7000Z. to replace the 3000Z., which, in 
pleach of trust, had been advanced to Maxwell Skipper out of 
|$liarlesj Skipper's estate. He then had to /account to Maxwell 
||§iipper for the balance of the 7000Z. The whole of the 
||700(K having disappeared except that which can be traced 
ll&to the Oceana shares, the proceeds of those shares clearly 
g|elong to the applicant either personally or as trustee. 
| p In a case of this sort the second part of the holding in In re 
WZaUetPs Estate (1) does not apply. I t cannot be said that the 
^shares were bought by Oatway out of his own money, and 
ttkat therefore he is entitled to hold them as against the 
Keneficiaries under-Charles Skipper's will. Where a trustee 
llj&s mixed trust money with his own and has purchased land 
l | r chattels out of the mixed fund, the beneficial owner can 
Sjt' (1) 13 Ch. D. 696. 
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JOYCE J. follow the trusfc money and is entitled to a charge on .|(i| 
1903 purchased proper ty : In re Hallett's Estate, (1) . The agplicaai' 
does not desire to press his personal claim to the proceeds o' 
the shares, provided that, the Skipper t rus t gets t h e benefi t^ 
t h e m ; but he submits tha t he is enti t led to recover agaia§£ 
Oatway's estate. ,\£ 
Yoionger., E.G., and Ashworth James, for the plaintiffs, ^|j§ 
were beneficiaries under Charles Skipper's will. The proceeds 
of the Oceana shares clearly belong to the Skipper trust. 
DiMvrhy E.G., A . WhitaJcer, and Grossfield, for the defendant 
Christiana Mg<ry Oatway. "When Oatway bought the shai$£ 
the .balance to'his credit at the bank was sufficient to enable 
him to pay for them apart from th,e 3000Z, trust money. Q?j£ 
proceeds of the shares belong to Oafcyvay's estate. It was .* 
own money which he drew out to pay for them. He w? 
entitled as against Maxwell Skipper to do that: In re HaUeii^ 
Estate. (1) ' .4/ 
Cur. adv. vvM*i 
May 2. JOYCE J . Oatway was co-trustee with Maxwe 
Skipper of the will of Charles Skipper, the father of the latter;, 
I n breach of trust 3000Z. was advanced from the trust t i 
Maxwell Skipper upon the .security .of a mortgage given by hifrf 
to Oatway alone. Oatway, as mortgagee, and under a pow$| 
of attorney from Maxwell Skipper, sold the mortgaged prti* 
perty, and as mortgagee received and gave a receipt for ife& 
3000Z. t rus t money, part of the proceeds of sale, vMM 
amounted to 7000Z. The rest he received as agent of or cr 
behalf of Maxwell Skipper, from w h o m h e held a power <ot 
attorney. Oatway, instead of investing the 3000Z. upon proper 
t rus t securities in the joint names of himself and Maxwell' 
Skipper, the trustees,, paid i n the whole 7000Z. on August 15>r 
1901, to his own banking account, which was then in credit lt<| 
the amount of 171. 13s. 4dL : Between August 15 and 24 >Jbfe 
paid in sums amounting to 30Z. and drew out 510L, which ha 
paid away to creditors or,otherwise applied to his own purpose-
i n such a manner as to be irrecoverable. 
(1) 13 Oh. D. 696. 







Ilk'Qn August 24, out of the- balance to the credit of the JOYCES J. 
Recount, Oatway paid 2137L..12s. 3d. for the purchase of 
pertain shares in the Oceana Company,-.which remained in his 
|?name at the time of his decease, and have since been sold by 
^arrangement. I t is the proceeds of these shares which is now 
[fix question. The balance to the credit of the account after 
pbhis payment, with some other sums paid in from time to time 
§§by Oatway, was subsequently exhausted by his drawings on 
phis own account. . -
p|*<T?he balance of the 7000L, after discharging the mortgage, 
belonged to Maxwell Skipper, but it is alleged that Oatway 
||ss. a creditor of his had claims thereon to a large amount. 
IpMaxwell Skipper, who was himself a party to the original 
ifbreach of trust, could not under, the circumstances, and in fact 
pices not, oppose the claim of the trust to the proceeds of the 
p|bceana shares. For the purposes of this case we may consider 
^jOatway to have been entitled to the balance of the 7000Z. 
|$fter discharging the 3000L mortgage. * 
pj; There is no conflict between -different fiduciary owners or 
I t is a- principle settled as far back 
of 
ffforni any property may undergo, the true owner is entitled to 
pseize it in its new shape if he can prove the identity of the 
i&riginal material: see Blackstone, vol. ii. p. "405, and Lujpton. 
gjf. White. (1) But this rule is carried no farther than necessity 
|?requires, and is applied only to cases where the compound 
ft" 
S&ets of cestuis que trust. 
||as the time of the Year Books that, whatever alteration 
^shares of the parties 
jfthut are mixed be uniform, 
as-such as to render it impossible to apportion the respective 
Thus, if the quality of the articles 
and the original quantities 
§.kuown, as in the case .of so many pounds-xof trust money 
||Eiixed with so many pounds of the trustee's^own money, 
ifee person by whose act the confusion took place is still 
Entitled to claim his proper quantity,. but subject to the 
Iquantity of the other proprietor being first made good out of 
pthe whole mass : 2 Stephen's Commentaries (13th ed.), 20. 
Prust money may be followed into land or any other property in 
& h i c h it has been invested; and when a trustee has, in making 
H (1) (1808) 15 Yes. 432; 10 B. K. 94. 
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any purchase ot investment, applied trust money together ^ | 
his own, the cestuis que trust are entitled to a charge oa-..tjj| 
property purchased for the amount of the. trust money laid ij^ 
in the purchase or investment. Similarly, if money held 0M 
any person in a fiduciary capacity be paid into his own banla$|| 
account, it may be followed by the equitable owner, who, J|$| 
against the trustee, will have a charge for what belongs to hxm 
upon the Balance to the credit of the account. If, then, t\M 
trustee pays in further sums, and from time to time draws otH 
money by cheques, but leaves a balance to the credit of thl| 
account, it is settled that he is not entitled to have the rule-ip 
Clayton's Case (1) applied so as to maintain that the SUEQ|| 
which have been drawn out and paid away so as to be incapabfef 
of being'recovered represented pro tanto the trust money, ai 
that the balance 'remaining is not trust money, but represent 
only his own moneys "paid into the -account. Brovmi^ 
Adams (2) to the contrary ought not- to be followed sini 
the decision in In re Hallett's Estate. (3) It is, in my opinidtf 
equally clear that when any of the money drawn out 
been invested, and the investment remains in the name icp 
under the control of the trustee, the rest of the balance having! 
been afterwards dissipated. by him, he cannot maintain th"aj| 
the investment which remains represents his own money alon^l 
and that what has been spent and. can no longer be traced? 
and recovered was the money belonging to the trust. 1$ 
other words, when the private money of the trustee' and| 
that which he held in a fiduciary capacity have been mixers 
in the same banking account, from which various payments^ 
have from time to time been made, then, in order to defer**] 
mine to whom any remaining balance or any investment.! 
that may have been paid for out of the account ought to be| 
deemed to. belong, the trustee must be debited with all thdj 
sums that have been withdrawn and applied to his own use so| 
as to be no longer recoverable, and the trust money in likej 
manner be debited with any sums taken out and duly invested^ 
in the names of the proper trustees. The order of priority inl 
' {i 
(2) L. B. 4 Gh. 764. . | 
a 
(1) (1816) 1 Mer. 572; 15 B. B. 161. 
(3) IS Gh. D. 696. 







Ivrhich the various withdrawals and investments may have JOYCE J. 
fbeen respectively made is wholly immaterial. I have been 
Preferring; of course, to cases where there is only one fiduciary 
downer or set of cestuis^ que trust claiming whatever may be 
;*left as against the trustee. In the present case there is no 
fbalanoe left. The only investment or property remaining 
Iwhich represents any part of the mixed moneys paid into the 
^bankitfg account is the Oceana shares purchased for 2137Z. 
fOpon these, therefore, the trust had a charge ior the 30001. 
Siarust money paid into the account. That is to say, those 
Ishares and the proceeds thereof belong to the trust. 
^ It was objected that the investment in the Oceana shares 
|was raade at a time when Oatway's own share of the balance 
jdfo the credit of the account (if the whole had been then justly 
fdistributed) would have exceeded 2137Z., the price of the 
tshares; that he was therefore entitled to withdraw that sum, 
[and might rightly apply it for his own purposes; and that 
^consequently the shares should be held to belong to his estate. 
l io this I answer that he nevei*was entitled to withdraw the 
$137Z. from the account, or, at all events, that he could not .be . 
^entitled to take that sum from the account and hold it or the 
^investment made therewith, freed from the charge in favour of 
Spe trust, unless or until the trust money paid into the account 
Sad been first restored, and the trust fund reinstated, by due 
Investment of the money in the joint names of the proper 
^trustees, which never was done. 
f: The investment by Oatw&y, in his own name, of the 21371. in . 
[Oceana shares no more got rid of the claim or charge of the 
$rust upon the money so invested, than would have been the 
§Jase if he had drawn a cheque for 21S1L ana dimply placed 
p&d retained the amount in a drawer without further disposing 
% St the money in any way. The proceeds of the Oceana shares pus t be held to helong to the trust funds under the will of 
|vhich Oatway and Maxwell Skipper were the trustees, 
m Solicitors : Fladgate & Co.; J. A. Bartrum. 
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c 
Restatement of the Law — Restitution 
Restatement (First) of Restitution 
Current through September 2004 
Copyright © 1937-2004 by the American Law Institute 
Part II. Constructive Trusts And Analogous Equitable Remedies 
Chapter 13. Following Property Into Its Product 
§ 212. Effect Of Withdrawals And Subsequent Additions 
Link to Case Citations 
Where a person wrongfully mingles money of another with money of his own and makes withdrawals 
from the mingled fund and dissipates the money so withdrawn, and subsequently adds money of his own to 
the fund, the other can enforce an equitable lien upon the fund only for the amount of the lowest intermediate 
balance, unless 
(a) the fund or a part of it earns a profit, or 
(b) the subsequent additions were made by way of restitution. 
Comment: 
a. The lowest intermediate balance. Where a person wrongfully deposits in a single account in a bank money of 
another and money of his own, and makes withdrawals from the deposit and dissipates the money so withdrawn, and 
subsequently makes additional deposits of his own funds in the account, the other person cannot ordinarily enforce 
an equitable lien upon the account for a sum greater than the lowest intermediate balance of the deposit. If the 
amount on deposit at all times after the deposit of the claimant's money equaled or exceeded the amount of his 
money so deposited, the claimant is entitled to a lien upon the deposit for the full amount of his money so deposited. 
If after the deposit of the claimant's money the deposit was at any time wholly exhausted by withdrawals before 
subsequent deposits of the wrongdoer's individual funds were made, the claimant's lien upon the deposit is 
extinguished, and if he is unable to trace the money withdrawn, he is relegated to a mere personal claim against the 
wrongdoer, and is entitled to no priority over other creditors of the wrongdoer. 
Illustrations: 
1. A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1000 belonging to B together with $1000 of his own. He draws out 
$1500 and dissipates it. He later deposits $1000 of his own in the account. B is entitled to a lien on the account 
for $500, the lowest intermediate balance. 
2. A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1000 belonging to B together with $1000 of his own. He draws out 
$1000 and dissipates it. He later deposits $500 of his own in the account. B is entitled to a lien on the account 
for the full amount of $1000, since the account was never diminished below that sum. 
3. A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1000 belonging to B together with $1000 of his own. He draws out the 
whole $2000 and dissipates it. He later deposits $500 of his own in the account. B is not entitled to a lien on the 
account. 
Copr. © 2004 The American Law Institute. 
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Restatement (First) of Restitution § 212 (1937) 
(Publication page references are not available for this document.) 
Comment on Clause (a): 
b. Where the balance earns a profit If the lowest balance is invested and earns a profit, the claimant can 
enforce an equitable lien not only for the amount of the lowest balance but also for the amount of the profit earned 
by it, although not for more than the total amount of his money which was wrongfully deposited in the account. The 
claimant is, however, entitled at his option to enforce a constructive trust as to a proportionate share of the product 
under the rule stated in § 211, although he thereby obtains more than the total amount of his money. 
Illustration: 
4. A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1000 belonging to B together with $1000 of his own. He draws out 
and dissipates $1500. He invests the remaining $500 in shares of stock which he sells for $1500. B is entitled to 
a lien on the proceeds for $1000. If he sells the shares for $3000, B is entitled at his option to enforce a 
constructive trust as to one-half of the proceeds, or $1500. 
Comment on Clause (b): 
c. Where later deposits made in restitution. Where a person wrongfully deposits in a single account in a bank 
money of another and money of his own, and makes withdrawals from the deposit and subsequently makes 
additional deposits of his own funds in the account, manifesting an intention to make restitution of the claimant's 
money withdrawn, the claimant's lien upon the deposit is not limited to the lowest intermediate balance. The effect 
of making the additional deposits by way of restitution for the amount withdrawn is the same as though the amount 
so restored had not been withdrawn. 
The mere fact, however, that a wrongdoer has deposited in his own account money of another and has made 
withdrawals and subsequently deposits money of his own in the account does not raise an inference of an intention 
to make restitution. On the other hand, if he deposited the money of another in a fiduciary account for the other, and 
wrongfully withdrew part of the money and subsequently made additions of his own money, the inference is that he 
intended to make restitution. 
Comment: 
d. Redeposit of money withdrawn. The rule stated in this Section is not applicable where the money withdrawn 
or traceable proceeds of that money are redeposited. If the money withdrawn from the account is subsequently 
redeposited in the account, the effect is the same as though the withdrawal had not been made, and the claimant's 
lien is not limited to the lowest intermediate balance. It is immaterial whether the money withdrawn was itself 
redeposited, or the money withdrawn was invested and the investments were sold and the proceeds were 
redeposited. 
Illustrations: 
5. A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1000 belonging to B together with $1000 of his own. He draws out 
$1500 of which he dissipates $1000 and redeposits the remaining $500 in the account. B is entitled to a lien on 
the account for $1000. 
6. A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1000 belonging to B together with $1000 of his own. He draws out the 
whole $2000 with which he purchases shares of stock which he later sells for $1500 which he redeposits in the 
account. B is entitled to a lien on the account for $1000. 
RESTRESTI§ 212 
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Total Beginning • * £
 W F B AcC0unt: 
Transfer trom Salt Lane vui 
Trust Money 
T K X * • " " • « « Account: 
Trust Money 
T r s S o r n S o u t ^ s t ^ F B Account: 
Trust Money 
Trust Money 
T r s K o r e a t B a s i n T r u c K s FSB Account 
Trust Money 








Total Beginning Balance 
Transfer From WFB Concentration Account 
Trust Money 
Other Money 
Transfer To WFB Concentration Account 
Associated Foods Truck Payment (Trust Money) 
Johnston Supply Truck Payment (Trust Money) 
—+other Receipts and Disbursements: 
r* Receipts 
g^ Disbursements 
Ch Ending Balance ~ 
678,571, 
16,359 
30,668 
121,434 
710 
66,637 
76,596 
3,608 
5,271 
